

동북아 평화를 위한 한·미·일 종교의 역할

The Role of American, Korean, and Japanese Religion
for Peace in Northeast Asia

- DMZ to HIROSHIMA -

일시

2023년 10월 25일(수) ~ 29일(일)

장소

참회와 속죄의 성당, 일본 히로시마 세계평화기념성당

DATE

OCTOBER 25th(Wed) - 29(Sun)

VENUE

The Church of Repentance and Atonement,
Hiroshima World Peace Memorial Cathedral



공동주관 • Co-hosted by /



한국천주교주교회의 민족화해위원회
Committee for the reconciliation of the Korean people



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경기도
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Opening Remarks

I would like to extend a warm and sincere welcome to all of you participating in the 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum (CKPF). I am Peter Ki-heon Lee, Bishop of Uijeongbu Diocese, and I hold ordinary jurisdiction over this diocese.

The Catholic Institute of Northeast Asia Peace (CINAP), founded in this area to fulfill and practice our Church's mission of peace, has come to hold its seventh conference.

In particular, we had the privilege of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) Committee on International Justice and Peace and the Catholic Bishops Conference of Korea (CBCCK) Committee for Reconciliation of the Korean People co-hosting the Forum in Washington, D.C., in the United States.

I vividly remember that when I was walking around the Capitol with the U.S. bishops in Washington D.C. last year, you all reassured me with fraternal words of encouragement, “Now, this is your first step.”

Since 2017, when the Forum began in the form of an international conference, the Bishops' Conferences of the United States and Japan have worked in solidarity for peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to the bishops and officials of Japan and the United States.

We are now all witnessing with deep concern the armed conflict between Israel and Hamas, which could escalate into new, larger conflicts. The violence, massive in scale and indiscriminate, resulted in tragic killing of numerous, innocent people and turning countless civilians into refugees, is evil and devastating.

The Russia-Ukraine war also shows no signs of ending, and the world is suffering from the ongoing war and hostile confrontations. The nuclear arms race that could potentially annihilate humanity in a moment still continues, and even at this very moment, various weapons of brutality are killing helpless people and destroying the environment.

The church must stand up against the violence in the war with determination, “Violence is a lie, for it goes against the truth of our faith, the truth of our humanity. Violence destroys what it claims to defend: the dignity, the life, the freedom of human beings.” (『Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church』 496), and now the humanity should renounce the false belief of ‘peace through strength’. The Encyclical of Pope John XXIII 『Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth)』, which was issued 60 years ago, affirmed “This requires that the fundamental principles upon which peace is based in today's world be replaced by an altogether different one, namely, true and lasting peace among nations cannot consist in the possession of an equal supply of armaments but only in mutual trust.” (『Pacem in Terris』 113).

We must now reflect on the true meaning and relevance of the teachings of Pope John XXIII, who presented a new milestone for peace at the height of the tensions of Cold War.

I believe that the Forum today will serve as a time we earnestly long and strive for true peace. I am deeply grateful to all those who work hard to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the world.

Bishop of Uijeongbu Diocese
Most Rev. Peter Ki-heon Lee

Congratulatory Remarks

“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God” (Mt 5:9)

Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to thank His Excellency Simon Ju-young KIM, Bishop of Chuncheon and President of the CBCK Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People, for inviting me to the “2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum” and granting me the opportunity to deliver a congratulatory remark at its opening ceremony.

The CBCK Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean Peninsula, in partnership with the Episcopal Conferences of the United States and of Japan, has been organizing this important event since 2017 to discuss alternative ways to achieve peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

This year we celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the Armistice of the Korean War. Unfortunately, from a technical point of view, the war is still not officially over. Throughout all of these decades, the Holy See has accompanied the situation on the Korean Peninsula closely and sustains all those who, with goodwill, seek reconciliation and peace, not only in this region, but also worldwide.

On last July 27th, on the occasion of this anniversary, a Holy Mass was celebrated at the Myeong-dong Cathedral in Seoul in the presence of bishops, priests and numerous lay faithful. His Holiness Pope Francis also sent a Message to the CBCK expressing his solidarity with the event.

In His Message, the Pontiff recalled that “the various wars... are a tragic reminder of the need for constant vigilance in defending and promoting justice and friendly cooperation within communities and between peoples.” And concluded by encouraging “all Koreans to be prophets of peace, which is always based on respect for each person”.

In 2014, during His Apostolic Journey to Korea, Pope Francis spoke eloquently about the importance of reconciliation and peace on this region. His addresses of ten years ago still offer valuable insights for us today.

In his first speech, delivered at the Meeting with Authorities in the “Blue House”, Pope Francis highlighted the need to give young people “the gift of peace”. He said that “this appeal has even more resonance here in Korea, a land which has long suffered because of a lack of peace”.

He also expressed his “appreciation for the efforts being made towards reconciliation and stability on the Korean Peninsula”, and encouraged those efforts, for they are “the only sure path to lasting peace”.

In his last Homily, delivered during the Holy Mass at Myeong-dong Cathedral, Pope Francis said that Korea’s quest for peace is “trust in the power of Christ’s cross”, and that that Mass was “first and foremost a prayer for reconciliation in this Korean family”. Thus, He invited the Korean people to be “prophets of peace” and to “welcome the reconciling grace of Christ” into their “own hearts and share that grace with others”.

On last September 16th, Pope Francis received in Rome a group of pilgrims from the Catholic Church in Korea, inviting them to “entrust to Saint Andrew Kim Taegon the dream of peace of the Korean Peninsula”, which is always in His “thoughts and prayers”.

Christ is our peace. In Him, we are reconciled with the Father and we become peacemakers. The barriers that divide us, and which are the fruit of men’s sins, are overcome by the One who loved his enemies to the point of dying on the cross for them. The blood of Christ, which reconciles us with the Father, is the true source from which authentic and lasting peace can spring out and inspire the hearts of men and women of goodwill in this Peninsula and worldwide.

Dear friends, I am confident that the distinguished speakers and participants at

this Catholic Peace Forum will offer to the Church and society in Korea, and to this entire region, an inspiring platform for exploring new and creative ways to bridge the gap between the parts in conflict and hopefully open concrete pathways for common understanding, reconciliation and peace-making in the Korean Peninsula.

May Mary, Queen of Peace, always intercede for us with her Son, so that this land can see a future of reconciliation, of peace, and that our North Korean brothers and sisters can one day receive again the light of the Gospel.

Our Lord Jesus Christ said that “blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God” (Mt 5:9). Thus, I assure you of my prayers for your respective and important missions and for the cause of reconciliation and peace in this one broken up family of the entire Korean Peninsula.

Thank you for the kindness of your attention.

Acting nuncio to the Republic of Korea

Fernando Reis

Congratulatory Remarks

Bishop Peter Ki-heon Lee, Bishop Simon Ju-Young Kim, Archbishop Hyginus Hee-Joong Kim, Bishop John Baptist Shin-Chul Jung, Abbot Blasio Hyun-Dong Park, Bishop Bernard Taiji Katsuya, Bishop Alexio Mitsuru Shirahama, and Governor Dong-yeon Kim, ladies and gentlemen:

As Chairman of the Committee on International Justice and Peace of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, I am sure that my brother bishop members of our committee as well as United States bishops here present, Bishop Richard Pates and Bishop Shawn McKnight, share my sentiments when I say how pleased we are to be here in South Korea with all of you. Thank you for your generous hospitality.

These seem to be increasingly perilous times. As we stand here in Paju, just a few miles from the Demilitarized Zone, I am all the more conscious of the tension that underlies the situation on the Korean Peninsula. With North Korea greatly increasing the number of its missile launches in the past year, I can well understand the urgency that South Koreans feel about the need to protect themselves in case of attack. To the Japanese participants in this conference, you too are conscious of your vulnerability to possible North Korean aggression.

As an American, I am also well aware of the sacrifice of so many lives during the Korean War. In Washington, DC and in many parts of America, there are memorials to the almost 37,000 U.S. troops that died on the Korean peninsula. But that number pales in comparison to estimates of a half million lives lost by both North and South Korea. The unfinished nature of that conflict that ended in an armistice adds to the anguish and uncertainty that exists today.

At the same time, we are here in this beautiful Church of the Atonement, a testament to the resilience of the faithful, trusting the Holy Spirit will continue to guide the Church to proclaim the Gospel and bring peace to this region that has experienced long-standing conflict. May this Peace and Unity Center

help support these aims.

Last October, I had the pleasure of meeting a number of Korean bishops when they visited the United States, and most of them are here today.

I recall talking with Bishop Peter Lee, our host, and hearing his story of having been born in Pyongyang, North Korea and having fled as a child with his family to the south. Throughout his ministry, Bishop Peter has worked for the reconciliation of the Korean people, so that families divided over 70 years ago can reunite. He and other bishops and the Church in general have been working to help North Korean refugees adjust and settle in South Korea. I have been impressed by what the Church is trying to do in South Korea to achieve that peace.

With the growing emergence of a multipolar world, state and non-state actors, asymmetric warfare and related technological advances, new complexities are being brought to bear on the just demands of statecraft. There is no doubt that achieving peace remains a long and arduous journey. The history of Inter-Korean relations and US-North Korean relations demonstrates the ups and downs of the journey. Currently we're in one of the "down" periods of increased tensions and renewed calls to militarize. Yet this is not unique to the Korean peninsula. What we have witnessed in Ukraine over the past two years and the eruption of the Israel-Hamas war a few short weeks ago soberly reminds us of the precipice on which we find ourselves.

In his 2014 visit to South Korea, Pope Francis, at a Mass at Seoul's Cathedral, urged, "Let us pray, then, for the emergence of new opportunities for dialogue, encounter and the resolution of differences, for continued generosity in providing humanitarian assistance to those in need, and for an ever greater recognition that all Koreans are brothers and sisters, members of one family, one people."

In 2017, speaking to an interfaith pilgrimage from South Korea, he stated, "We have, therefore, a long journey ahead of us, which must be undertaken

together with humility and perseverance, not just by raising our voices but by rolling up our sleeves, to sow the hope of a future in which humanity becomes more human, a future which heeds the cry of so many who reject war and implore greater harmony between individuals and communities, between peoples and states.”

As this conference begins, I would invite all here to consider what would constitute peace on the Korean peninsula? What are the concrete steps that can be taken to create greater harmony? Who can play a role in re-engaging with North Korea because there cannot be a dialogue without a willing partner? How can our Catholic faith contribute to a vision of peace on the Korean peninsula?

As the Korean Church wrestles with these weighty questions on this long journey, be assured that the U.S. bishops wish to support your efforts in pursuit of lasting peace in the region. Thank you.

Chairman of the USCCB's Committee on International Justice and Peace

David J. Malloy

Congratulatory Remarks

Congratulations on this occasion of holding the Catholic Korea Peace Forum. For the last three years in the COVID-19 pandemic, our activities were subject to various restrictions but during this period, the global political landscape underwent some significant changes. Russia's invasion of Ukraine stunned the world, and the increasing emphasis on the necessity of military deterrence has had a considerable impact on the security environment in Northeast Asia. In addition, although the theory of nuclear deterrence has been proposed based on the premise that nuclear weapons cannot be used, President Putin mentioned that tactical nuclear arsenals can be used and went as far as the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, a neighboring country, which sent an abrupt, sobering message on the threat of using nuclear weapons across the globe. Furthermore, the repeated missile launches by North Korea have increased the threat of nuclear weapons.

In this trend, the Japanese government argued that the country requires revamping of its defense capabilities to be equipped with necessary level of deterrence, and planned that its national defense spending would increase to 1.6 times the current level over a 5-year period, and acquire 'counterstrike capability' against enemy bases. Also, the Japanese government is planning to build a missile base on the Ryukyu Islands and utilize it as a military base in preparation for China's maritime advances or in case of an emergency situation in Taiwan. Needless to say, the theory of war deterrence through armament is based on fear and distrust of the other side, and therefore, in modern times, such deterrence-based balance can easily be disrupted by incidental, unforeseen events. For real peace-building, we must start with building mutual trust through diplomatic efforts based on dialogue. This idea has already been presented more than half a century ago in the Encyclical of Pope John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris* (Peace on Earth).

"The fundamental principles upon which peace is based in today's world

be replaced by an altogether different one, namely, the realization that true and lasting peace among nations cannot consist in the possession of an equal supply of armaments but only in mutual trust.”(Pacem in Terris, 113) These days, if anyone makes such claims in Japan, he or she would be jeered as having “unrealistic idealism” or grounded in “flower garden theory (unrealistic optimism).” However, Pope John XXIII goes on to say, “We are confident that this can be achieved” (Pacem in Terris, 113). If we continue to lower the standards of ideals to match reality just because of the gap between reality and the ideal, the world we live in will become a miserable place dominated by absurdness of human and deep-rooted sin. We must hold onto lofty ideals and strive to make reality closer to the ideal, albeit little.

In order to aim at building peace that does not rely on armament, the first thing we must emphasize is that there is no justification for any military action. Consider the recent cases of ‘war’; each side claims that their war is justified under the pretext of defense. When it comes to the war in Ukraine or the armed conflict between Israel and Hamas, the question of which is the legitimate side often comes up as a hot topic. However, it is innocent citizens who are sacrificed in war. Is there such a thing as a legitimate victim? We believers have no intention of engaging in ideological discussions about which is the legitimate side. Instead, we must sympathize with the pain of those who are disregarded and stay by their side.

It was quite a long time ago, but during the Iraq War, a famous Japanese newscaster made a remark during a news broadcast to the effect that “mistaken bombing by the U.S. bomber aircraft is equivalent to terrorism,” and was heavily criticized in Japanese society. A majority of media outlets and weeklies condemned the newscaster. The criticism was based on the argument that the mistaken aerial bombing, which should be classified as “legitimate act in combat,” can by no means be considered equivalent to terrorism, an act of indiscriminate killing of civilians. I also watched the

news myself at the time but his comment was based on his sympathetic position on the pain of the victims rather than notional discussion on the legitimacy of terrorism or combative actions such as aerial bombing. From the victims' perspectives, what they experienced is no different from terrorism or aerial bombing in that their lives were suddenly and unreasonably taken away. From such viewpoint, my understanding was the newscaster was implying that the incident leading to such consequence of killing cannot be considered appropriate and that we would need solutions other than the means based on armed attacks. However, the newscaster was dropped from further broadcasting later on. I remember feeling sad and frustrated that Japanese society was not able to understand or accept his argument or position.

Through the previous world wars, Japanese people experienced the enormous affliction caused by war from both sides: as perpetrators and as victims. The war was an experience of slaughter from indiscriminate attacks on innocent citizens not only in Japan but also in many other Asian countries. In particular, the tragedy caused by the atomic bombing was beyond description. However, there has not been much public discussion about whether the dropping of the atomic bomb was a justifiable act of combat or a criminal and indiscriminate mass murder of civilians. Rather than having such discussions, the misery and pain from the war were shared by the entire nation, and thus, Japanese people were able to make a determined resolution that war must be avoided at all costs and Japan would never wage war again. Therefore, the Japanese people were able to accept the Constitution, which is based on the ideology of no war, in true sense and show continuous support toward the "no war" provision. These experiences that passed down through generations have been engraved deep in the hearts of Japanese people as a yearning for permanent peace and a pledge of no war. Nearly 80 years have passed since World War II, and I am concerned that the reality of the misery of war and appreciation

of the people are gradually turning into a faint memory, to the point of considering war as a notional concept. In the reality of battlefield, there is no such thing as a 'righteous war'. Furthermore, as Pope Francis emphasized, mere possession of nuclear weapons itself is morally unacceptable. I hope that in the distant future not only 'war' but all acts of armed forces will be deemed illegal. But before that, I pray that our hope of abolishing nuclear weapons, which seems so close to our reach, will come true. I strongly urge nuclear weapons states, including Japan, to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

In August of this year, in time for the atomic bombing anniversary, two bishops from the United States, Archbishop Paul Etienne of the Archdiocese of Seattle, and Archbishop John C. Wester of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, who are with us in this Forum by online means, visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Their archdioceses are closely involved in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons in the U.S. The fact that the Archbishops are sending a strong message from the United States to abolish nuclear weapons represents symbolic meaning of tremendous significance. I wholeheartedly agree with and support the statement of 'Partnership for a World without Nuclear Weapons' , which they announced together with the bishops of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and hope that this movement will create extended partnerships and build solidarity. Lastly, I would like to conclude my congratulatory remarks with the hope that this Forum will contribute to fulfilling God's will, calling us to serve on the road to peace.

Bishop of Sapporo Diocese

Bernard Taiji Katsuya

Session 1

2023

Catholic Korea Peace Forum

Threat of Nuclear Weapons and the Arms Race

A Madhouse of War: Arms Race and Threats of Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula

(Heajeong Lee • Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University)

Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Possible?

(Akira Kawasaki • Executive Committee member, Peace Boat · International Steering Group member, ICAN)

The Road to Nuclear Disarmament: Building Relationships for a Movement

(John Charles Wester • Archbishop of Santa Fe, New Mexico Soo-young Hwang)

Soo-young Hwang • Manager, Center for Peace and Disarmament & Center for International Solidarity,

People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)

Chihiro Okawa • Professor, Kanagawa University

Yuko Nagasawa • Taiwan Foreign Ministry Invited Visiting Scholar, Academia Sinica

A Madhouse of War:

Arms Race and Threats of Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula

Heajeong Lee

(Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University)

The Korean War (1950-1953) was arguably the hot war that globalized, militarized, and institutionalized the Cold War. In July 1953, the Korean War ended not with a peace treaty but with an armistice. During the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula had been an epicenter of rivalry not only between the two Koreas but also between their allies and partners – the U.S. Soviet Union, China, and Japan. The end of the Cold War did not bring a peace dividend to the Korean Peninsula. Rather it led to a strange arms race or the so-called North Korean nuclear crisis.

Diplomatically isolated and economically devastated, North Korea had embarked on a rather tortuous nuclear armament-diplomacy to ensure its survival against the overwhelming power of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In 2018, a virtuous circle of diplomatic normalization-peace regime-denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was agreed upon between two Koreas and the U.S. under the respective leadership of Moon Jae-in, Kim Jung-un, and Donald Trump at the Panmunjom and Singapore summits. This was a radical vision of peace because it required a complete overhaul of the existing division-armistice-alliance system on the Korean Peninsula. Soon the militarism of the existing system reared its head and prevailed on the Korean Peninsula and in the world.

In early February 2019, the Trump administration notified Russia that it would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

in six months for Russia's alleged violations of the treaty. The INF Treaty of 1987 was a historical marker of the end of the Cold War, and an iconic symbol of human reason to recognize the insanity of the balance of terror – Mutual Assured Destruction. In late February 2019 at Hanoi, Trump foiled Kim Jung-un's dream of a 'small deal' – trading nuclear facilities at Yongbyon for the lifting of sanctions imposed on North Korea – by leaving the summit without any agreement.

Both events marked the end of a post-Cold War era/hope for peace, and the beginning of a new era of nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula and in the world. North Korean nuclear crises were closely intertwined with the historical evolution of wars and nuclear regimes in the world. The US-North Korea agreement at Geneva in 1994 was made possible by the need for the U.S. to institutionalize a permanent and global non-proliferation system. The U.S. was not genuinely committed to diplomatic normalization and peacebuilding. Rather it believed in the imminent collapse of the North Korean regime.

Hopes of a post-Cold War peace began to crumble in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Driven by the pursuit of absolute security—a combination of fear/anger and military primacy/unilateralism –, the Bush administration launched a war on terror, designated North Korea along with Iraq and Iran as an 'axis of evil,' and abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty – the basis of the Cold War nuclear deterrence. With the collapse of the Geneva Agreement and the negation of 'negative security assurance,' North Korea embarked on a new round of nuclear armament – the so-called second North Korean nuclear crisis. Russia vehemently opposed the US attempts to build missile defense system.

The Bush administration's military unilateralism proved delusional. Its war on terror, coupled with the 'Great Recession,' had eroded the very military, economic, and ideological foundations of its power. Trapped in an unwinnable war in Iraq, it resorted to a multilateral format of six-party talks to deal with the second North Korean nuclear crisis. But the new forum also failed to create a new basis for peace. North Korea had carried out 6 nuclear tests and numerous missile tests, culminating in the successful development of an ICBM in 2017. Meanwhile, China had risen to

challenge US hegemony, and Russia's revisionism or grievances against the US led to its war against Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea, and intervention in Ukraine in 2014.

In 2019, the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty has rushed in a new nuclear age in the world, which is much more unstable than the previous Cold War and post-Cold War periods. During the Cold War, the stability of nuclear deterrence was premised upon the strategic parity of the US and Soviet nuclear powers and the ABM Treaty, and the geopolitical stability of the whole world, especially that of East Asia was based not only upon the US-Soviet Union understanding of each other's respective sphere of influence but also upon the US-China rapprochement. The collapse of the Soviet Union and China's 'strategic' acceptance of US unipolarity was the foundation of the post-Cold War world order in general. The Trump administration's withdrawal from the INF Treaty was part of a new strategic campaign to preserve US primacy over the great powers of Russia and, especially China through a policy of 'peace through strength', including a comprehensive modernization of nuclear armament.

The instability of the third nuclear age stems from many factors. First, three-way nuclear competition is inherently more complicated than two-way nuclear competition. China's nuclear arsenal is still small compared to that of the US and Russia but, it is growing rapidly. Both the US and Russia had to think through a scenario in which one would defeat the other but become a weaker party vulnerable to China. Such a strategic nightmare has called for a massive buildup of the US nuclear arsenal.

Second, there is no general cooperation or collusion between the three great powers, comparable to their cooperation during the Cold War nuclear game. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and threatened to use nuclear weapons, and in March 2023 it suspended the New START Treaty – the only remaining nuclear arms treaty between the two countries, which expires in 2026. China is not a party to the treaty and given the long-term prospects of US-China rivalry or strategic competition, there is little chance that China would agree to a new trilateral nuclear arms control treaty.

Third, disruptive technologies such as sensors and AI, etc. have

undermined the traditional logic of nuclear deterrence. There are many technological 'fantasies' or concerns about the ability to detect and destroy an adversary's nuclear weapons before or after launch, for example, by hypersonic missiles.

Fourth, in this third nuclear age, there are new 'regional' nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea. It is a thorny question – strategically and ethically – whether, how, and under what conditions the international society and the existing nuclear powers should accept these powers. Another complicating feature of the third nuclear age is that these new, regional powers are involved in a complex geopolitical game among themselves and with other great powers. The India-Pakistan-China trilateral game is a case in point.

The Korean Peninsula after Hanoi's 'no deal' in 2019 may be one of the most complex and complicated security dilemma cases of the third nuclear age. North Korea is the weakest of the six parties and has been subject to the US nuclear umbrella/threat and sanctions ever since the Korean War. From its perspective, developing nuclear weapons is a 'rational' strategy for survival.

But, unlike India and Pakistan, North Korea has rarely been accepted by international society as a de facto nuclear power. In addition to an 'ethical hurdle', some experts question its nuclear capabilities such as re-entry vehicle technology. Moreover, there are strong strategic-technological drivers for counterforce/damage limitation strategies, which in turn destabilize nuclear deterrence. For example, South Korea's 3-axis strategy has tried to deter North Korea by denial (missile defense) and by punishment (such as decapitation). North Korea has, in turn, responded by diversifying its nuclear arsenal – strategic, tactical, and various delivery systems – and, in 2022 codifying the preemptive use of nuclear weapons and delegating command and control in an emergency (as a countermeasure to decapitation).

Alliance politics is another factor to spurs the arms race and destabilizes nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. However rudimentary North Korea's nuclear capability may be, it has led many South Koreans to

question the US extended deterrence and to seek new options for autonomous nuclear armament or 'nuclear sharing,' or at least for strengthening extended deterrence. From a US perspective, there is no way to demonstrate the US president's resolve, and 'over-reliance' on nuclear deterrence would only increase tensions with North Korea by provoking its military responses.

This is exactly what happened in the July-August 2023 military showdowns between North Korea and the US-South Korea alliance. North Korea launched another ICBM; the US dispatched an SSBN submarine as a sign of the strengthening of extended deterrence, which was reciprocated by North Korea's missile launch. This is a vicious action reaction, a security dilemma. But, for the US, it is a rather reasonable price/inducement for restraining South Korea's independent nuclear armament and buying South Korea's cooperation with Japan and contribution to its Indo-Pacific strategy and Ukraine policy.

Alliance politics by the US has pushed Japan to massively rearm against the threats from China and North Korea: in late 2022 Japan declared that it would increase its military spending to 2% of GDP, the third largest after the US and China. The US is now closely integrating its alliance with South Korea and with Japan. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration of South Korea has doubled down on the US and has begun to challenge China's policy on Taiwan. The US-Japan-South Korea (semi-) alliance would keep China and North Korea together, or at least keep China from abandoning North Korea.

Two Koreas are also involved in the Russia-Ukraine War. South Korea, as a US ally, has participated in economic sanctions against Russia and has been asked to provide aid (including munitions) to Ukraine. The war provided North Korea an opportunity to enhance its diplomatic profile. North Korea was one of Russia's most consistent and committed supporters in the war. In desperate need of munitions, Russia has recently sought military and strategic cooperation with North Korea. The Putin-Kim summit in September 2023 represents a marriage of convenience between two arch enemies of the US, or 'pariahs,' ostracized by the US and its allies South Korea and Japan. Strategic cooperation between North Korea and Russia would prolong the war in Ukraine and tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Possible?

Akira Kawasaki

(Executive Committee member,
Peace Boat · International Steering Group member, ICAN)

Greetings to you all. I would like to take this chance to thank the organizers of Catholic Korea Peace Forum for giving me the opportunity for a speech today.

I would like to give a presentation on the topic, “Is a world free of nuclear weapons possible? - A perspective from Japan.” To the question, ‘Is a world free of nuclear weapons possible?’, I would like to reply with a clear-cut answer “Yes.”. Elimination of nuclear weapons is possible. This is because nuclear weapons are weapons of self-destruction, aimed at annihilation of the entire human race. This serves no reasonable purpose in terms of national security or safety of people. “Nuclear weapons must be abolished,” the Japanese people have repeatedly appealed, based on what they have undergone in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. At the center of the appeals were the atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

One atomic bomb was dropped over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and one over Nagasaki on August 9. As a result, the estimated death toll amounted 140,000 people in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki by the end of that year. Although accurate figures do not remain, research has shown that one in ten people exposed to radiation in Hiroshima was from the Korean Peninsula. At the time, the Korean Peninsula was under colonial rule by Japan, which explains that many Koreans lived in Japan at the time. Koreans were conscripted into forced labor by Japan during the colonial period, and many of these people were also exposed to the radiation from

the atomic bomb.

Even after that year, the aftermath and suffering of the atomic bomb victims continued. The consequences of radiation lasted for decades. All of the people who were exposed to high dose radiation immediately after the bombing and developed acute radiation syndrome died soon after. Among those who survived and are now referred to as ‘atomic bomb victims’, there are many who are suffering from critical illnesses such as cancer decades after the radiation exposure. In other words, it can be said that they have been always living with the bomb inside their body.

According to the official position from the Japanese government, genetic effects on the second and third generations of those exposed to radiation are not recognized. However, it is true that many atomic bomb victims have family members who developed cancer or leukemia at a young age, and many of the survivors are concerned that the exposure may affect not just their generation but their offspring.

The bleak truth is that a single atomic bomb destroyed an entire village, and that the heat rays, blasts, and radiation brought about miserable destruction; however, that is not the end of the story. The suffering of the atomic bomb victims continues to this day. We need to properly recognize the reality of continuing affliction even after 78 years.

There are currently as many as 12,000 nuclear weapons in the world. This is a significant decrease compared to the numbers in the Cold War era. In the past, the number of nuclear arsenals was as high as 70,000 in the mid-1980s. The number was reduced substantially to 12,000. However, most of the 12,000 nuclear warheads that exist today are dozens to hundreds of times more powerful than the atomic bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the time. We will have to stretch our imagination to figure out what kind of consequences will arise if these weapons are used.

There are still many of the nuclear weapons posing existential threats to humanity today. Moreover, nowadays, we have a situation of Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine. Also, there is the armed conflict between Israel, a nuclear-armed state in the Middle East, and Palestine. As for East Asia, there are mounting military tensions in relation

to nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula or programs of North Korea on development of nuclear weapons or missiles. In this situation, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons poses realistic, tangible threats. However, I believe we need to properly discern what will really happen to us if nuclear weapons are used in real-life conflicts.

Nagasaki University, in collaboration with many international think tanks, has conducted research under the project title, “Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia: Implications for Reducing Nuclear Risk,” and the report on the findings of the research has been published. From the report, we can predict that if a serious armed conflict to the extent of using nuclear weapons breaks out in East Asia, it will escalate into catastrophic, irreversible consequences.

Despite the presence of such threats, the reason why I stated at the beginning of the speech on purpose, “Elimination of nuclear weapons is possible,” is because, based on examples from history, when humanity is faced with situation of escalating threats, we learn a lesson from such threats and come up with solutions.

For example, in 1961, the Cuban missile crisis broke out. The United States and the Soviet Union at the time came closest to an all-out nuclear war over the issues of deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba.

The two superpowers managed to avoid the worst consequence somehow. Now, do you know what happened after the crisis? Neighboring countries of Cuba in Latin America set out to establish the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone, stating that the countries wanted not to repeat such nuclear threats ever again. This is the birth of Latin America's nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed by the Latin American countries under the leadership of Mexico.

Over time, the NWFZ expanded across different parts of the world. We now have NWFZ in much wider regions including South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia. Mongolia is the only country in East Asia to declare the country an NWFZ. In this way, countries that were left to face nuclear threats have chosen the path of denuclearization .

On the other hand, nuclear-armed states also made some efforts. The United States and the Soviet Union continued to engage in nuclear arms race, but in 1985, the leaders of the two countries, Reagan and Gorbachev, published a joint statement that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’

In other words, the countries that possessed, developed, and deployed nuclear weapons themselves realized ‘if the current rate of an increase in nuclear warheads continues, it will lead to disastrous consequences’ and changed their political and strategic direction toward disarmament. Then, in 1987, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed. At the time, there were discussions that all classes of nuclear weapons should be abolished and not just intermediate-range ones. Although the two countries have not reached that stage, it can be said that the INF Treaty has made some progress toward disarmament.

In the end, there was the so-called Cold War era that lasted for more than 40 years after World War II, but the countries that continued the nuclear arms race to take supremacy realized that ‘the current arms race should not continue’ and established a number of consultative bodies to discuss disarmament.

However, unfortunately, there is also a movement to nullify such efforts and discussion or destroy international agreements or systems of disarmament. Fighting against such movement, the campaigns to make some real progress in disarmament in accordance with international law have also gained momentum.

I think in the current global political landscape, the two sides are confronting each other at loggerheads.

From the viewpoint of disarmament regime under international law, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force more than 50 years ago. Most of the countries in the world signed as a party to the NPT.

However, the problem was that the five nuclear-weapon states recognized in the NPT have not made sufficient efforts to actually practice nuclear

disarmament.

Also, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted more than 25 years ago. However, this treaty has not entered into force yet. Still, most of the countries in the world have already signed the treaty, to the effect that these countries are banned from conducting nuclear tests. With North Korea as the only exception, most countries around the world have chosen not to conduct nuclear tests. However, Russia recently made a parliamentary decision to revoke its ratification of the treaty.

The reason for withdrawal from the treaty was, “Russia is mirroring the position of the U.S.” Obviously, the United States and China have not yet ratified the treaty, resulting in a setback from the perspective of nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, rather than viewing nuclear weapons as a means of taking over supremacy among nations, campaigns to think of nuclear weapons with a focus on devastating consequences, the damage and victims from the use of the weapons or from the perspective of the impact on human life, society and environment have gained increasing attention.

The first proposal of CTBT was a culmination of ongoing civil society movements since the 1980s that stemmed from the awareness that the environment would be polluted and damaged by nuclear tests taking place around the world, resulting in catastrophic harm to all of us living on Earth.

Likewise, a civil society campaign called the ‘World Court Project’ in the 1990s led to an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 that ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international law’. The ICJ also ruled that all states that possess nuclear weapons are obligated to bring to a conclusion on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

The campaigns and ICJ’s ruling paved the way for the ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)’. A treaty for total banning of nuclear weapons and setting a path to their abolition was advocated by a global movement led by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear

Weapons (ICAN), and countries such as Austria, Mexico, and Costa Rica joined in supporting the global movement to take further steps. TPNW was adopted by the UN in 2017 and entered into force in 2021.

As of today, the time when this video footage is filmed, 97 countries have either signed the TPNW or already joined as the member states. That is, approximately half of the countries in the world are already members to the TPNW. These countries have reached a consensus that nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated under any circumstances.

The foundation of this treaty was the idea that the possession and use of nuclear weapons are against humanitarian principles.

Half of the countries in the world have joined the TPNW, which regards the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL, also referred to as the laws of armed conflict), stating that the devastating consequences in humanitarian terms that nuclear weapons would bring are totally unacceptable under any circumstances. This is a critically important progress in history. It can be said that this progress has been made as a result of the efforts over the last 10 years.

However, unfortunately, few countries in East Asia, especially Northeast Asia, have signed the TPNW. Mongolia is the only exception and all other countries in the region have not joined the treaty as yet.

The reason for such low rate of endorsement is thought to be the political logic named ‘Nuclear Deterrence Theory,’ which is still prevalent in this region.

China, Russia and the United States are nuclear-armed states. North Korea also possesses nuclear weapons and is gradually increasing its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. South Korea and Japan do not possess nuclear weapons and are therefore members of the NPT, and in Japan's case, they also have the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. However, both countries have a policy of relying on the nuclear umbrella, a security commitment, of the U.S. In the past, U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed on the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear weapons were also deployed in Japan during the Cold War.

Under these circumstances, I think the biggest challenge for us to confront is how to bring changes in the national and regional security situations in which the countries are dependent on nuclear weapons, as well as facing the limitations as a divided nation.

The civil society movements in Japan, in cooperation with those in South Korea, have proposed the establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia and pushed for its implementation.

South Korea, Japan, and North Korea joining the TPNW at the same time may serve as an effective method to establish an NWFZ in Northeast Asia.

When the three countries signed the TPNW, North Korea will naturally have an obligation under international law to abolish its nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner within a given timeline. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan, as signatories of the treaty, will be bound by a legal obligation not to assist or promote the policy of the U.S. using nuclear weapons on behalf of South Korea and Japan. In this way, we will all be able to assure national and regional security that does not rely on nuclear weapons. Under this aim, it is important that civil societies in the region work in partnership in unity. Japanese civic groups are promoting large-scale movement and campaigns in Japan based on mutual cooperation.

Furthermore, we are making formal requests that the Japanese government attend the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, which will take place from November 27th this year at the UN Headquarters in New York City. Even if Japan cannot sign or ratify the TPNW right away on this occasion, there will be a route to participate in the meeting as an observer. We would like to make the same request for the South Korean government.

I believe that Northeast Asian countries need to first get involved in the TPNW in any possible form and engage in this dialogue to pave the way for national and regional security without relying on nuclear weapons.

The atomic bombing 78 years ago inflicted catastrophic damage to people in Northeast Asia, in particular. The appeal to abolish nuclear weapons sent from Northeast Asia, the affected region, to the world would indeed deliver

the essence of the message with significant weight. I also think it is important for citizens who are opinion leaders as well as many religious leaders, to send the message that the abolition of nuclear weapons is also a humanitarian request.

Thank you for this opportunity of presentation to speak to you in this Forum today.

The Road to Nuclear Disarmament: Building Relationships for a Movement

John Charles Wester (Archbishop of Santa Fe, New Mexico)

Thank you all for this opportunity to make some comments about the needed road to nuclear disarmament. I regret that my many responsibilities as an Archbishop have prevented me from attending in person. Nevertheless, I am privileged to have your esteemed company through this recording. May God bless all of you and give you the strength to persevere in this most important work.

I want to talk about how our collective road to nuclear disarmament must be built upon productive relationships. To help illustrate this by personal example, I want to thank three people who I understand are at this conference.

But first, my own committed journey on the road to nuclear disarmament began with a local team supporting me in the writing of my pastoral letter *Living in the Light of Christ's Peace: A Conversation Toward Nuclear Disarmament*. I hope you have or will read my pastoral letter and reflect upon it. I felt compelled to write it given that the birthplace of nuclear weapons is within my own Archdiocese. Pope Francis has declared that even the mere possession of nuclear weapons is immoral.

I have come to deeply believe that the possession of nuclear weapons by anyone is a threat to all. It has to be understood that nuclear weapons are a class of weapons unto themselves. This is because of their scale of lethality and residual effects, such as radioactivity, that can harm generations.

Nuclear weapons are deeply immoral because of their indiscriminate killing of women, children, noncombatants, the old, the newborn and the infirm. It is my belief that the Catholic Church, however imperfectly following the example of our savior Jesus Christ, should take up nuclear disarmament as a critical pro-life issue. Isn't that common sense when one nuclear weapon can kill millions and inflict incalculable suffering on the wounded living?

Turning back to my pastoral letter, the cohesiveness of my writing team and the letter itself are a testament to the value of productive relationships. I could not have done it by myself. In that vein, I want to specifically thank Fr. Peter Kang, Director of the Catholic Institute of Northeast Asia Peace, who took it upon himself to see that my pastoral letter was translated into Korean and Japanese. Thank you so very much Fr. Kang for helping to internationally extend its reach.

I also want to thank the Archbishop Emeritus of Nagasaki, Joseph Mitsuaki Takami, and the Bishop of Hiroshima, Alexis Mitsuru Shirahama, who I believe are here at this conference. I give them and Nagasaki Bishop Peter Nakamura my deepest thanks for the tender and loving hospitality they extended to me, my fellow traveler Paul Etienne, Archbishop of Seattle, and our staff during our recent pilgrimage to Japan to commemorate the 78th anniversaries of the atomic bombings.

This too is a story of relationships, where the four dioceses of Santa Fe, Seattle, Hiroshima and Nagasaki entered into a formal partnership to work on nuclear disarmament. We released a statement from Nagasaki on August 9, the 78th atomic bombing anniversary, expressing explicit support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which the Vatican was the first nation-state to sign and ratify. Archbishop Emeritus Takami and Bishop Shirahama, I will always cherish our new partnership and friendship and the excellent hospitality that you showed. I am already thinking of returning in August 2025 for the 80th anniversaries of the atomic bombings, by which time we should all strive for concrete and measurable progress toward nuclear disarmament.

While in Japan I had the honor of meeting some of the atomic bomb survivors, the hibakusha. I have also had the honor of giving a healing

ceremony in my own Archdiocese for the generations of downwinders that have suffered from the Trinity Test which began the atomic age. I quote what President Regan said to the Soviet Union some forty years ago: “A nuclear war can never be won and must not be fought,” which President Biden repeated at the United Nations last year. I assert that the only way to guarantee no nuclear war is to get rid of nuclear weapons.

I want to quote a man much smarter than me. After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Albert Einstein said, “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe. ... the solution to this problem lies in the heart of mankind.”

He further said, “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.” He added, “Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind.” So, let us combine our faith and science in wisdom and compassion to purify our hearts, bring resolve to our minds, and work toward nuclear disarmament.

But let us address why relationships are important in working toward nuclear disarmament. That may seem like an obvious matter given that human beings are by nature social animals. But numbers matter and numbers are what politicians respond to. We have to move politicians if we are ever to bring about a future world free of nuclear weapons. And the only way you can build a movement is through relationships.

Why do we need to do this? The best historic example I can think of is that Ronald Reagan was an ardent Cold War warrior in his first term as president. But in his second term he turned into a nuclear weapons abolitionist. That didn't happen out of nowhere. One major reason for his conversion was that a million people marched in Central Park in New York City protesting the dangers of the Cold War.

You may recall that Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came tantalizingly close to signing nuclear weapons ban treaty in 1988, only to have it undone by Reagan's pipe dream of building a ballistic missile defense that came to be popularly known as Star Wars. Now, 35 years and a couple of hundreds of billions of dollars later, we still have nothing that will protect

us from nuclear war. Instead, the sad fact is that we are falling backwards with Putin's and Kim Jong Un's nuclear threats and the massive so-called modernization programs of the nuclear powers.

What should we do? We must build enduring relationships that work on nuclear disarmament. I go back to the formal partnership that the dioceses of Santa Fe, Seattle, Hiroshima and Nagasaki formally established. In keeping with this conference's stated objective of "strengthen[ing] the solidarity between the U.S., Korea, and Japan's Bishops' Conference to promote peace on Northeast Asia," I suggest broadening that partnership to include other dioceses in our three countries. Further, we should work to institutionalize nuclear disarmament as a critical pro-life issue in the Catholic Church.

On a secular level, I note that there is a total of 193 countries that are member states of the United Nations plus two nation-states with observer status. One of those observer states is the Vatican, which was the first to sign and ratify the ban treaty. In fact, the Vatican was at the center of the lead up to the ban treaty, playing a strong role in promoting international examination of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. That process led to the actual drafting of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Out of the 193 member states in the United Nations, 122 nation-states voted in favor of opening the ban treaty for signatures in July 2017. Since then, 93 countries have signed the ban treaty and 69 have ratified it, with more signing over time. We need only four more countries to sign on before we can say that a majority of all nation-states have done so. This is true building of international relationships outlawing the deadliest of all weapons of mass destruction. This is something that common sense says should be the international norm since chemical and biological weapons have already been banned for decades.

Of course, a skeptic can justifiably state that what really counts is to have the nuclear powers sign on to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Not surprisingly, the nuclear weapons states have opposed the ban treaty from the very beginning, with the US Ambassador and the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and France denouncing the ban treaty in a staged press conference just outside of the United Nations.

While there, U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley, now a Republican party candidate for president, declared that the U.S. and its allies viewed their nuclear stockpiles as critical, irreplaceable security assets and that North Korea's nuclear ambitions made global disarmament talks totally impractical. The British and French foreign ministers claimed that their countries remained committed to nuclear anti-proliferation through other international venues.

But what other credible international frameworks are there given the repeated failures of the last three Review Conferences of NonProliferation Treaty to bring about any progress toward nuclear disarmament whatsoever? Remember that more than a half century ago the nuclear weapons powers promised to enter into serious negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, in exchange for which the non-weapons states promised to never acquire them. The nuclear weapons states have never even begun to honor that solemn commitment.

There are now nine nuclear weapons states. In addition, there are 31 NATO countries plus South Korea, Japan and Australia under the U.S.'s so-called extended nuclear deterrence. None of them have signed the ban treaty. To bring this home to this conference for peace in Northeast Asia, a concrete step that South Korean and Japanese citizens could take to accelerate progress toward nuclear disarmament is to pressure their governments to at least send observers to future Meetings of State Parties to the ban treaty. As precedent, there has been one crack in the NATO alliance in that Dutch citizens compelled the government of the Netherlands to observe the First Meeting of the State Parties. I am urging my South Korean and Japanese brothers and sisters to demand the same of their governments. I'll even observe that the likelihood of successfully doing so is higher in Japan and August 2025, the 80th atomic bombing anniversaries, should be the target date for just that.

But why do that here in South Korea when there is an imminent nuclear threat from the North?

To answer that, we must first step back and question the very nature of so-called deterrence. Why is it that both Russia and the U.S. have thousands of nuclear weapons instead of just the few hundred needed for just deterrence?

Why are all the major nuclear weapons powers undergoing massive so-called modernization programs that will completely rebuild their existing nuclear weapons and produce new designs, plus buy new missiles, submarines and bombers to deliver them? Why is it that Russia, China and the U.S. are all expanding their testing sites when their nuclear weapons have already been extensively tested?

The answer is that this is not just mere deterrence but instead is a hybrid of deterrence and nuclear warfighting capabilities that can destroy civilizations. To understand this, I specifically recommend reading *The Doomsday Machine* by the recently deceased Daniel Ellsberg, the ex-nuclear strategist turned famous whistleblower.

Nuclear warfighting is simply not acceptable when, for example, six years ago President Trump threatened North Korea "with fire and fury like the world has never seen." Do I have to spell out what that would mean for the Korean Peninsula? Do I have to spell out what Putin's nuclear threats over Ukraine would really mean if carried out? I can say that I have some grasp of the utter horror because the Bishops of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took me to their atomic bombing memorial museums. But the horror today would be vastly bigger given the utter destructiveness of modern thermonuclear weapons.

We must work diligently through our relationships to avert nuclear war. I note the increasing nuclear threats from Kim Jung Un responded to by President Yoon Suk-yeol on your country's 75th Armed Forces Day. He said that North Korea's "threats to use nuclear weapons" pose an "existential threat to the people of South Korea and a major challenge to global peace" while also threatening that South Korea could "end the North Korea regime."

President Yoon Suk-yeol also referred to the "the Nuclear Consultative Group" formed with Japan and the U.S. earlier this year to strengthen trilateral military cooperation. But where does this end? More than seventy years ago, your country was ripped apart and is still yet to be rejoined and made whole. No matter what you think of the North Korean regime, would it not make sense to at least sign a peace treaty that recognizes the end of military hostilities from a time as long ago as I am old? Couldn't a peace treaty be a steppingstone toward peace and reconciliation that would cause

neither country harm? Surely it is not too much to ask for. And surely it is better than the status quo, which is the escalating buildup of nuclear tensions that could inflame the entire world.

We need to sustain a serious global conversation about universal, verifiable nuclear disarmament. We can no longer deny or ignore the dangerous predicament we have created for ourselves with a new nuclear arms race. This new arms race is arguably more dangerous than the past Cold War because of multiple nuclear actors and the rise of cyber and hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence. A nuclear arms race is inherently self-perpetuating, a vicious spiral that prompts progressively destabilizing actions and reactions by all parties. We need nuclear arms control, not an escalating nuclear arms race.

Further, we need to figure out concrete steps toward abolishing nuclear weapons and permanently ending the nuclear threat. If we care about humanity, if we care about our planet, if we care about the God of peace and human conscience, then we must start a public conversation on these urgent questions and find a new path toward nuclear disarmament.

Pope Francis has made clear statements about the immorality of possessing nuclear weapons, moving the Church from past conditional acceptance of “deterrence” to the moral imperative of abolition. Moreover, we are robbing from the poor and needy with current plans to spend vast sums of money to keep them forever.

The Catholic Church has a long history of speaking out against nuclear weapons. In recent years, Pope Francis has led the Church in a dramatic shift away from conditionally supporting deterrence to denouncing nuclear weapons as immoral and calling for their complete abolition. As Pope Francis declared, “We must never grow weary of working to support the principal international legal instruments of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.” I consider it to be the duty of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, the birthplace of nuclear weapons, to support the nuclear weapons ban treaty while working toward universal, verifiable nuclear disarmament.

In late November I will travel to the United Nations in New York City to

witness the second meeting of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. I encourage my peers in senior Catholic leadership to do so as well. There we can join the Nuncio at the United Nations to support the nuclear weapons ban treaty that the Vatican was the first to sign and ratify. Our growing presence will exert more pressure on the nuclear weapons powers to eventually honor that ban treaty, just as they have for earlier treaties banning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

In closing, I have shared Pope Francis' call for nuclear disarmament, based on the Gospel teachings of Jesus on peacemaking, nonviolence, and universal love. I propose that we now move on to nuclear disarmament itself, that we might heed Pope Francis' call to take new steps to end the production and maintenance of nuclear armaments and create a new future without nuclear weapons.

Jesus came into the world as the true light. He came to lead us out of the darkness of violence, death, and destruction. His light is the exact opposite of the searing light of a nuclear weapon. His light is the true light of universal love and compassion. His light of peace enables us to see a way forward on the path of life to a world without nuclear weapons.

But it is not enough that we become instruments of peace, as important as that is. No, we must take up the cause of worldwide nuclear disarmament with an urgency that befits the seriousness of this cause and the dangerous threat that looms over all of humanity and the planet. I call upon all of us to take up the challenge of nuclear disarmament by engaging in the vital discussion and building relationships that lead to concrete action steps toward this noble goal.

Your brother in the Light of Christ's Peace,

Most Reverend John C. Wester, Archbishop of Santa Fe

Recommended reading: Pastoral Letter: *Living in the Light of Christ's Peace: A Conversation Toward Nuclear Disarmament*, Archbishop John C. Wester, January 2022, <https://archdiosf.org/living-in-the-light-of-christs-peace>
Translations in Japanese, Korean and Spanish are also available at that same link.

Soo-young Hwang

(Manager, Center for Peace and Disarmament & Center for International Solidarity, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD))

The current crisis on the Korean Peninsula is such that armed conflict could break out at any time. With talks between North and South Korea cut off, everyone is concerned about an accidental armed conflict. Researchers who have been studying the issues over the Korean Peninsula for a long time also unanimously say this situation as an “unprecedented war crisis”.

On this small peninsula, South Korea and the United States frequently hold a joint military exercise, one of the largest in the size and the scale in the world. The ROK-US joint military exercises conducted in August 2023 included the use of both nuclear and non-nuclear force. North Korea’s response to military actions taken by South Korea and the United States has also become more and more intransigent. North Korea is currently conducting a record number of missile tests, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). As a result, the governments of South Korea, the United States and Japan are stepping up military cooperation and military exercises to military alliance level.

In January of this year, the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission released the results of investigating the Airspace Violations that occurred in both South and North Korea in December 2022. At that time, a North Korean military drone crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and flew into the South, and the South Korean military attempted to shoot it down only to fail. Then, the South Korean military also flew a drone to invade North Korean airspace. The commission concluded: Both South and North Korea have violated the armistice agreement. Both two Koreas began this year, the 70th anniversary of the armistice, with violating the armistice agreement. It is unclear whether the armistice that has been unstable for 70 years will be maintained in the future.

Security Dilemma

What is even more dangerous is the fact that South Korea, the United States and North Korea have declared and are rehearsing the “pre-emptive strike” against each other. South Korea and the United States are practicing operational plans, including pre-emptive and decapitation strikes against the North Korean leadership, and deploying U.S. military warplanes capable of dropping nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in the name of “extended deterrence”. In response, North Korea also announced the 2022 Nuclear Force Policy Act which includes provisions for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons if an attack is deemed imminent or if its leadership is threatened.

In the Washington Declaration of April 2023, the leaders of the United States and South Korea declared the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to strengthen extended deterrence on the condition that Korea fulfills its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). President Yoon Seok-yeol hailed the declaration as an opportunity to upgrade the ROK-US alliance to a “new nuclear-based paradigm”. In June, immediately after the Washington Declaration, the Yoon government announced a new “National Security Strategy”. In this announcement, “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” was replaced by “denuclearization of North Korea”. Through several ROK-US summits, the two countries’ messages on denuclearization and peace building on the Korean Peninsula have also changed. The terms such as “implementing the agreement between North Korea and the U.S.” and “achieving permanent peace” gradually disappeared, and “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” has been changed into “denuclearization of North Korea” since the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit in August 2023.

The Korean Peninsula is caught in a classic security dilemma. The more “deterrence” is extended, the greater the risk of attack and accidental armed conflict. Worse, even the minimal channels of communication to prevent an accidental conflict do not currently work. The inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean dialogues are completely disconnected. Not since the end of the Cold War has there been such a long breakdown in dialogue like this. In this situation, even a miscalculation or a trivial mistake could lead to an armed conflict, which could escalate into a nuclear war. Yet we cannot see any preventive action against armed conflicts or efforts to manage this crisis.

The prospect of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” is on the wane and the nuclear threat is growing. North Korea finally lifted the moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests it had maintained during four years of talks and has rapidly expanded its nuclear arsenal since then. South Korea and the United States are also conducting joint military exercises using nuclear power to prepare against the “North Korean nuclear threat” and are reorganizing their alliance as a “nuclear-based alliance”. It is a situation in which they are all developing nuclear-based military strategies competitively. Unfortunately, in the process, the goal of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” has become more and more remote and has practically disappeared. What is becoming clear is the growing presence of nuclear weapons on and around the Korean Peninsula.

Instead of peaceful cooperation, factional confrontation is taking over. International cooperation in resolving the crisis on the Korean Peninsula is weakening, and factional confrontations are becoming more structured. Amid the confrontation between the bloc of South Korea, the United States, and Japan and that of North Korea, China, and Russia on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia, there is a growing risk that the disputes and conflicts will become entrenched with the armistice line on the Peninsula as a front line.

New approaches need to be explored to change this unstable situation. It is the “peace-first” approach. Since the stalemate of the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula (PPKP), the “peace through strength” approach pursued by the countries involved has proved to be a failure. It only increased mistrust and aggravated the situation.

We must prevent accidental armed conflicts and the recurrence of war. We must build trust by improving relations. We must solve problems through dialogue and cooperation, not sanctions and pressure. We must reduce our armaments and rethink our aggressive military strategies. We must eliminate all kinds of nuclear threats from this Peninsula. We must break the vicious cycle of the arms race and save people and the planet. We must end the war that is not yet over.

One voice to end the Korean War,

Korea Peace Appeal: Peace Campaign to End the Korean War

For three years since 2020, the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, the Campaign to End the Korean War has been running the Korea Peace Appeal, a petition to:

End the Korean War and sign a peace agreement.

Create the Korean Peninsula and a world without nuclear weapons and threats.

Resolve conflicts through dialogue and cooperation, not sanctions and military threats.

Break the vicious cycle of the arms race and invest in civil safety and the environment.

More than 200,000 people from almost every country around the world signed the petition online and offline.

Declarations of support came from various figures in the political, religious, academic, and cultural and artistic circles at home and abroad. In response and echo to the peaceful actions of the civil society, many voices were heard one after another: local councils across the country, including the border provinces of Gyeonggi-do, Gangwon-do, Incheon, the capital city of Seoul, and Jeollabuk-do, passed resolutions calling for the end of the war, and about 500 lawmakers and local government leaders have participated in the signing. We also succeeded in collecting signatures from members of the National Assembly and proposing the “70th Anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, Resolution Calling for Peace Building on the Korean Peninsula”. The World Council of Churches (WCC) and major religious leaders such as Pope Francis, and Dalai Lama have offered their support and encouragement for the journey toward peace. Also, Nobel Peace Prize Laureates – Rima Bowie, Shirin Ebadi, and Tawakkul Karman, and the leaders of award-winning organizations such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and the Pugwash Conference, as well as Thomas Quintana, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights in North Korea, have also signed the petition.

In 2023, to mark the 70th anniversary of the armistice, we organized the “Global Action Month for Korea Peace – 17 metropolitan areas, 130 cities, countries and districts in Korea, 265 actions and 12 countries, 73 cities, 151

actions overseas” – to unite the voices for peace as one in 300 places around the world simultaneously. In addition, we continued various activities such as peace marches and rallies, open forums and symposiums, activities calling for the suspension of the ROK-US joint military exercises, online actions and the production of various contents in Korean and English. Through these activities we have helped to raise awareness of the issues of the unfinished Korean War and contributed to spreading the fact that the improvement of hostile relations and the signing of a peace agreement are the fundamental solutions to resolve the conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Across the country and across borders, the sincere hearts of countless people have come together. It has been a journey shared not only by Koreans, but also by overseas compatriots and citizens around the world. Approximately 700 domestic civil societies and religious organizations, seven major religious denominations, and more than 80 international partner organizations are now participating in the “Peace Campaign to End the Korean War” and “the 70th Anniversary of the Armistice, Peace Action on the Korean Peninsula”. We are the largest and broadest global network dedicated to ending the Korean War. We have been striving to make a movement that anyone can easily join and to become a loudspeaker and a network of networks to make the voices of those who want peace on the Korean Peninsula resonate louder and more exciting.

After 70 years of armistice, the Korean Peninsula is again at the crossroads of “war” and “peace”. It is our responsibility and right to end the age-old war and turn the armistice into peace. The world will not improve on its own, and peace will not come unless we talk about peace. The hope for peace lies in us, not in anyone else, and the countless people we have met on the streets and online have proven this simple wisdom. The journey to create the future that has eluded us for the past 70 years will continue.

Challenges facing modern politics, abolition of nuclear weapons, and the message of the Synod of Bishops

Chihiro Okawa (Professor, Kanagawa University)

First of all, I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations on this meaningful event of the 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum (CKPF) and also my sincere gratitude for inviting me to the panel discussion in the forum.

I would like to start by asking for your patience on my specialties; since I specialize in modern Japanese politics, the issues of international politics or the abolition of nuclear weapons are not my main research topic and there may be some parts in my discussion that are affected by my limited background or deviate from the main theme. I would like to ask your kind understanding on this aspect during the session.

Each presentation delivered by the speakers was highly interesting and offered me valuable insights. The presentations were particularly helpful in broadening my understanding of the current situations and challenges around the problems of nuclear weapons and their abolition, both in terms of region-specific knowledge centered on the Korean Peninsula as well as worldwide perspectives. Also, I now have more appreciation for the position of the Catholic Church on the issue of abolishing nuclear weapons.

Presentation by Professor Lee Hye-Jeong has pointed out that while the saga of nuclear weapons development by North Korea still continues to date, the decline in the diplomatic leverage of the U.S. and the growing presence of China posed additional challenges in terms of complicated power dynamics around nuclear issues, casting doubt on the nuclear

non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Under these circumstances, there are concerns that the current situation of the Korean Peninsula may stall without progress, entrenched in the vicious cycle of national security dilemma or forming a military bloc. In this case, the journey to abolishment of nuclear weapons may turn into a very long one.

Furthermore, in his presentation, Archbishop John Wester pointed out that contrary to the common belief that nuclear weapons are merely used to deter nuclear attacks from other states, these weapons are actually developed with the intention of waging nuclear war. Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher (Secretary for Relations with States within the Holy See's Secretariat of State) at the UN General Assembly in late September also stressed the elevated threat “Regrettably, the risk of nuclear war is at its highest in generations”¹⁾. These remarks all indicate the pressing urgency worldwide on the issue of nuclear weapons.

However, Korea and Japan are under the nuclear umbrella of the US. In order to turn the goal of nuclear abolition into a reality, as Archbishop J. Wester’s message points out, the very existence of nuclear-armed states and major countries under nuclear deterrence becomes an important issue. This is because the presence of and relationship between these countries serve as a political declaration that nuclear weapons would protect people’s lives more than the effect of nuclear abolition, in which case we all run into a moral dilemma. Can we truly say with confidence that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is nothing more than idealism, an armchair argument, or a product of idle talk?

Certainly, within Korean society, with deep-rooted doubts about the extended deterrence of the United States, public opinion in favor of nuclear armament also gains strong support, in the present situation of a growing, imminent “threat” on the peninsula. Considering the background, how is TPNW perceived in Korea? Also, it would be interesting to examine the implications and possibilities in the TPNW under the current political landscape of the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile, from my perspective as a researcher of Japanese politics, I

1) Catholic Times(No. 4691) October 15, 2023

would like to briefly introduce the current situation in Japan in relation to this issue.

First of all, public opinion in Japan is in favor of TPNW, overall. According to the Asahi Shimbun survey in 2020, 60% of the respondents were in favor of Japan's joining the TPNW, and even among the supporters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, more than half responded that they were in favor of Japan's joining the TPNW²⁾. I believe this trend has not changed to any significant extent to this day.

Examining how Japanese politics evolved since World War II, differences in political stance on the issue of national security and diplomacy have served as major elements comprising the axis of conflict in politics. Since the 2000s, the conservative shift of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians has been revealed through real-life cases,³⁾ while in the case of voters, although there are different hypotheses, it can be said that they have not turned to the conservative side as much as the politicians of LDP. However, there is strong, unwavering trust and support from the voters for the Self-Defense Forces and the US-Japan security alliance⁴⁾. In addition, opinions in favor of aggressive approaches to strengthening defense capabilities continue to prevail following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and escalating tensions in the national security environment across neighboring regions. ⁵⁾

However, according to the results of a mail survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in 2023, the percentage of responses in favor of constitutional revision was the second highest ever in their history of the survey, whereas the percentage of opposition to the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which advocates international peace based

2) November 17, 2020 .The Asahi Shimbun

3) E.g. Taniguchi Masaki, *Representative Democracy in Japan - Voters and Politicians* (Iwanami Shinsho) 2020.

Nakakita Koji·Yuta Owada, *The Conservative Swing of Liberal Democratic Party and the Logic behind the Change*.

Eiji Oguma·Naoto Higuma, *Has Japan Turned Conservative?*(Keio University Press) Part 3-1, 2020.

4) Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister "Summary of the public opinion poll on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Affairs"

<https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r04/r04-bouei/gairyaku.pdf> (Last accessed, October 12, 2023).

5) May 7, 2023, The Asahi Shimbun

on justice and order, was still significantly higher over the advocates for the revision. In addition, the public stance in support of the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the emphasis on non-armed aspects in national defense do not show any sign of weakening⁶⁾. In fact, regardless of party affiliation, most politicians in Japan take the position that Japan must hold onto the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.⁷⁾

When it comes to the issue of the national security of Japan, even as the regime and politicians try to take further steps toward "peace through strength," voters take a flexible stance, adapting to the changing situations and continuing to strike a balance between the U.S.-Japan alliance and pacifism. Meanwhile, regarding the issue of nuclear weapons, it can be said that the entire society of Japan including politicians, is taking a very cautious stance.

As we look into the nuclear weapons issue, if nuclear weapons were actually used, it would lead to a catastrophic disaster to humanity. In order to avoid such risks, a cool-headed analysis of the current situation is thought to be crucial. Of course, we need to stay away from undue optimism about the outlook of Japan. We must also pay close attention to the fact that the painful memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are fading away over time. However, on the matter of considering the possibility of nuclear abolition, I believe that the opposing stance against nuclear weapons forming the base of Japanese politics since World War II to this day should never be underestimated. In this aspect, perhaps there may be room for a change in the attitude regarding the fact that the Japanese government is maintaining a cautious attitude toward the TPNW although G7 summit was held in Hiroshima this year...?

As for the cool-headed analysis on the current situation, I was impressed by how Prof. Lee analyzed the military capabilities of North Korea in an objective, balanced manner. I think we may have a clue here

6) May 3, 2023, The Asahi Shimbun

7) Find more information on political stance on adhering to Three Non-Nuclear Principles of candidates of each political party in Japan, reported through the joint survey between the Asahi Shimbun and the research team of Professor Taniguchi Masaki, the University of Tokyo. (the survey was conducted around the time of the Japan House of Representatives election in 2021) on the website of the Asahi Shimbun

<https://digital.asahi.com/senkyo/shuinsen/2021/asahitodai/>(Last accessed, October 12, 2023년).

that can help us avoid the dilemma of national security and ease tensions around the geopolitical landscape.

Meanwhile, as an expert in the analysis of domestic politics and party politics in Japan, I would like to address a few points in relation to Korean politics. When we think about Korean party politics, the first thing that springs to our mind is the conflict between conservatives and progressives. Whether the South Korean regime takes a hawkish or conciliatory stance toward North Korea is believed to have had a significant impact on the diplomatic and national defense policies of other countries. However, it is also true that the policies of Korea have faced various restrictions by the policies of foreign affairs and national security in other countries, including the United States. If we looked back on how the former Moon Jae-in administration's policy of conciliatory stance with North Korea was affected by other external factors, we would have a clear idea of political dynamics with bilateral or multilateral influence.

When considering the upcoming prospect of reducing tensions and moves toward abolishing nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, I believe it is imperative to look back on what lessons could be learned in the process from 2018 to 2019, and think about how, as a democratic country, to build a stable relationship with North Korea, overcoming the issue of political polarization or the risk of regime change.

Political polarization is not just a problem of Korean politics. In one of the presentations, I was drawn to a convincing argument that nuclear abolition was a “Pro-Life” approach. However, with the diversification of individual or societal values, it is worth noting that even the position on whether nuclear abolition was pro-life or not is turning into a political issue, causing divisions in the United States and other countries. Given these circumstances, I wonder whether there would be anyone who can argue with certainty that they can resist against the temptation to exploit peace as a political means.

Polarization is a common challenge among countries that have adopted representative democracy as their political system, resulting in diminishing trust in democracy itself and even dysfunction of democracy in some

cases. Since different political systems have different pros and cons in terms of economic performance and response to national emergency such as COVID-19 pandemic, there are quite a few opinions stating that political absolutism has the upper hand over representative democracy .

However, in absolutism there is a problem of restrictions on the freedom of association, whereas in democracy, there is a widespread problem of low participation in general, which is essential for proper functioning of association.

In view of the issues we have discussed so far, the theme of the 16th Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops of the Catholic Church (currently ongoing and to be concluded next year), “For a synodal Church: communion, participation and mission,” has meaningful implications not only for Catholic Church but also for modern politics and society. Furthermore, the formal pledge to “Partnership Towards a World without Nuclear Weapons”, which Archbishop Wester also introduced, is an embodiment of the spirit of this Synod and a concrete step toward abolition of nuclear weapons, and I also have a great interest on the pledged partnership. I hope that more dioceses will join the partnership beyond those in Japan and the United States.

Jesus Christ said, “Peace be with you” (John 20:21), to us all, and this is a universal statement. As we have seen from presentations today, upholding peace is never an easy task. Pope Francis also spoke about peace and shared his message that establishing evangelical peace is never simple. However, he urges us to, “face conflict head on, resolve it and make it a link in the chain of a new process (Apostolic Exhortation 『Gaudete et Exsultate (Rejoice and Be Glad)-On the call to holiness in today’s world』, 89).

The Catholic Church and all of us here today must endure the contradictions and barriers of real-life politics, resist the temptation to use peace merely as a political means, and move on to make progress. Just as the church learned from Jesus' perspective, discerned among the evidence of the times, and ultimately accepted the abolition of nuclear weapons, we also need to take steps together in unity so that the

modern world and society can get even a little closer to the abolition of nuclear weapons, to protect all life⁸⁾.

Finally, I would like to conclude my discussion by reflecting on what it means to be living in this land closest to North Korea today, and express my genuine hope that peace, free of nuclear weapons, will settle on the Korean Peninsula as quickly as possible.

Thank you.

8) Theme of the papal visit of Pope Francis in 2019.

Toward Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, Facing Retreat from Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges confronting governments of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan and the Catholic Church and their Roles

–Limitations of INF Treaty and New START Treaty, implications of enemy base counterstrike capability and exclusively defense-oriented strategy, and suggestions for the upcoming 80th atomic bombing anniversary

Yuko Nagasawaa

(Taiwan Foreign Ministry Invited Visiting Scholar, Academia Sinica)

It has been 15 years since the former US president Obama called for a “nuclear-free world” in Prague (April 2009), pledging to ratify a nuclear test ban treaty. However, the present global landscape shows that the journey on the road to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has still a long way to go, facing roadblocks and deteriorating international security environment.

I have specialized in international politics, the history of foreign policy of East Asia and the U.S., the political landscape on the Korean Peninsula, in particular, and the limitations of international treaties aimed at peacebuilding such as the Treaty of San Francisco and the issues of war and colonial reparations. I have also taken part in open and closed-door meetings of Korea-Japan think tank and through visits to North Korea, I have engaged in policy development and recommendations for defense policy in East Asia and post-war reparation issues in South Korea-Japan and North Korea-Japan relations. In particular, my research has focused on the inter-Korean peace regime,

the normalization of relations between South Korea-Japan, and North Korea-Japan, conflicts between South Korea, the United States and Japan over the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (multilateral treaty on prevention of nuclear proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear technology), as well as post-war compensation for atomic bomb victims living in South Korea and the issues of restitution of looted cultural properties. Thus, I have attained many valuable insights from the related research or activities of civic organizations presented through this Forum. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for all the efforts of the staff from the co-hosts including Rev. Peter Ju-Seok Kang and everyone involved in hosting this event.

As Professor Haejeong Lee (Chung-Ang University) pointed out in his presentation “A Madhouse of War: Arms Race and Threats of Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula,” the following two major events that took place in February 2019, caused a major setback in the global political landscape in terms of making any progress toward nuclear disarmament and beginning of arms race for countries involved: ① Withdrawal of the U.S. from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles: INF Treaty), ② Donald Trump cutting Hanoi summit short with no agreement, not letting the North Korea get away with a “small deal.”

INF Treaty served as an international treaty of a symbolic value, marking the beginning of nuclear disarmament and a commitment between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that paved the way to the end of the Cold War. This treaty was an agreement signed by President Reagan of the U.S. , who placed emphasis on the ideal of elimination of nuclear weapons, and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1987, toward the end of the Cold War, based on the common understanding that “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The agreement mandated the U.S. and the Soviet Union, for the first time in history, to reduce their nuclear arsenals, employing rigorous and extensive verification measures including on-site inspections. The significance of the INF Treaty lies in that during the Cold War era, the

U.S. and the Soviet Union came to a mutual agreement and promised to dismantle specific types of missiles, and furthermore, 1) the treaty remained effective even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Russia reaffirmed its support for the treaty, 2) although the name of the treaty includes “intermediate-range nuclear forces,” it requires elimination of not only the missiles of intermediate-range at 500 to 5,500 kilometers but all of the conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, and 3) the two countries actually destroyed a total of 2,692 short, medium and intermediate-range missiles.

As Professor Lee discussed in his presentation, the Trump administration's withdrawal from the INF Treaty was part of a new strategic campaign to preserve US military primacy over China, a rival power of the U.S. At the time, in addition to 70 intercontinental ballistic missiles, China also had 16 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs, ranges 3,000 to 5,500 km), which were subject to dismantlement under the INF Treaty, and 80 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, ranges 1,000 to 3,000 km) capable of mounting nuclear warheads. Among these missiles, the entire territory of Japan is within the range of MRBMs, and the range of IRBMs includes the entire Southeast Asia in addition to Guam. Here, I considered how the alliance politics emphasized by Professor Lee could be applied to these missile ranges. The INF of China not only includes Asian allies of the U.S. within their range, but also has the ability to attack major US military bases in Asia such as Okinawa and Guam. The US-China arms race is evidenced by the latest report on the increase in Japanese defense spending and military spending of South Korea. In line with a point raised by Professor Lee about a record increase in the defense budget of Japan for 2022, I reviewed the situation in the fiscal 2023 of Japan and found that the defense budget increased by 26% compared to the amount in 2022. The Japanese government announced that fiscal 2023 marks the start of a five-year period intended for fundamental revamping of the country's defense capabilities, aiming for enhancing its military capabilities to 1.6 times the current level, and the issue has emerged as a problem that requires careful consideration. From the defense budget, 211.3 billion yen has been earmarked for deployment of the US cruise missile, ‘Tomahawk’,

acquiring a stand-off missile capability for defense to bolster 'counterstrike capability' to attack the enemy's missile base from outside the range. Japan originally planned to acquire 400 Block V missiles, the latest version of the Tomahawk, in fiscal years 2026 and 2027 but the plan changed, and it was announced that the acquisition period needs to be brought forward one year, which will involve changing 200 of those missiles to the Block IV, a previous model of the Tomahawk. The Japanese government argued that it was necessary to strengthen the 'counterstrike capability against enemy bases' to enhance 'deterrence' due to China continuing its military buildup, ongoing threats from North Korea's repeated nuclear/missile development, and tensions from China-Taiwan relations. However, Kyoji Yanagisawa (柳沢協二), a former defense official, who administered the affairs of defense policy serving as the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary under Koizumi, Abe, Fukuda, and Aso administrations from 2004 to 2009 and several researchers of international politics voice their dissent and criticism on this hike of national defense spending, pointing out that such 'energy base counterstrike capability' will not serve as a 'deterrent' under current circumstances. The reasons are as follows: 1) The counterstrike capability would rather allow reasons for enemies to attack Japan, and attacking the enemy base would trigger vicious cycle of attacks from both sides. 2) Since China is a nuclear-armed state, it is unlikely that enhancement of missile counterstrike capability will act as a deterrent. 3) In addition to the move toward the counterstrike capability, the Kishida administration also plans to resume nuclear power plant activity. However, all of Japan's nuclear power plants (NPPs) are located along the coastline, and about 60% of the sites are located along the coastline of the Japanese archipelago, geographically heading toward China and the Korean Peninsula, indicating high risk in resuming operation of these NPPs. NPPs are vulnerable to missile attacks from air raid, and in fact, an attack on an NPP during the Russian-Ukrainian war may lead to catastrophic damage.

4) The 'exclusively defense-oriented policy' based on the Japanese Constitution is a high-level defense strategy explicitly stating that Japan will not obtain strike capabilities. The strategy of announcing to the

other country that Japan will not pose a threat that may cause damage to the other country's territory is a defense strategy that does not give the other country an excuse to attack Japan. Therefore, acquiring a counterstrike capability at this point indicates collapse of the premise of this strategy. Post-war Japan has adhered to the spirit of 'Peace Nine', the importance of which was also emphasized by the Japanese Catholic Church. "Japanese people shall aspire sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order", "and forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes". This is Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and stipulates the renunciation of war. Ken Endo, a professor of international politics at the University of Tokyo, also stressed that global trust in post-war Japan, which advocates pacifism, is a valuable resource for the benefit of Japan. However, Japan's political statements regarding the increase in national defense spending after the war stirred distrust and wariness in neighboring countries about Japan's rearmament. Notwithstanding these circumstances, it is evident that Japan's shift in defense policy to bolster its counterstrike capabilities at this point is expected to have a negative impact not only on Japan's national security but also on its relations with neighboring countries.

As Professor Lee addressed in his presentation, the military conflict between the U.S. and Russia is one of the factors causing the retreat from disarmament. In February 2023, Russia announced its decision to suspend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty), the last remaining treaty limiting strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. also announced that it would no longer exchange data on its strategic nuclear arsenals with Russia. Then, Russia announced that it would stop sharing advance notice about the country's missile (intercontinental ballistic missile; ICBM) tests with the U.S. Due to the series of events, considering that the U.S. and Russia are nuclear superpowers, not only has the information transparency on strategic nuclear arsenals been lost worldwide, but tensions over their use have also escalated. Considering that China is not a party to the treaty and also the US-China rivalry, as Professor Lee pointed out, it is highly unlikely that the three great powers, the U.S.-Russia-China would come

to a consensus regarding nuclear disarmament. Moreover, we are thrown into security dilemma of various forms in international relations such as North Korea launching another ICBM, the U.S. deploying ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and the U.S.-South Korea-Japan holding a trilateral aerial exercise, and I also agree with Professor Lee's argument that the recent Russia-Ukraine War and the closer strategic cooperation between North Korea and Russia have further complicated the alliance politics. Since the world has headed toward a new Cold War and we see the return of history of conflicts between alliances, nuclear arsenals or missiles are no longer regarded as something to be deterred but as a means of warfare and attacks. Now, the heightened tensions are such that the conflicts no longer remain as theoretical operations and strategies of military officials, but we do face the reality of international conflicts looming at any moment.

Although nuclear disarmament is in retreat as we discussed above, Archbishop John C. Wester's presentation on "The Road to Nuclear Disarmament" showed us a glimmer of hope, enlightening us with what kind of efforts the Catholic Church is making at the forefront of the activities on abolition of nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that Pope Francis, who visited Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 2019, clearly condemned 'nuclear deterrence', which had been accepted by his predecessors, and openly voiced, "the mere possession of nuclear weapons is immoral" and that Vatican is the first country in the world to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Archbishop Wester emphasized, "we have the duty to work toward universal and verifiable nuclear disarmament and support the TPNW" and furthermore, in August this year, Archbishop Wester, along with Paul Etienne, Archbishop of Seattle, visited the World Peace Memorial Cathedral of Hiroshima and participated for the first time in a peace rally under the title, "Speak out, No peace with nuclear weapons!" hosted by the Diocese of Hiroshima. The Archbishop's commemorative lecture on nuclear disarmament was reported nationwide by many channels of Japanese media with favorable responses.

I have looked into in more detail how the committed journey of

Archbishop Wester to nuclear disarmament began. New Mexico in the U.S. is where the Truman administration conducted the Trinity Test as top secret on July 16, 1945. The 'Trinity Site', the site of testing the first atomic bomb detonation at the time, was 3.7 times the size of Tokyo, and it has been reported that the maximum levels of radiation from this site are 10 times greater than the region's natural background radiation. Due to health impact from the test suffered by residents who lived near the test site at the time, one of the affected patients founded the Tularosa Basin Downwinders Consortium (TBDC) in 2005 and the discussions surrounding the compensation are ongoing with the U.S. government who continues to claim that the area around the Trinity Site was a "remote and uninhabited area."

Archbishop Wester stressed that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is immoral, and that Catholic Church should take up nuclear disarmament as a critical pro-life issue, and condemned the lethality of the weapons with indiscriminate, mass killing as a threat to all. Since the human rights and moral issues will be covered in a separate session in this Forum, I completely agree with the opinion of Archbishop Wester that the problem of abolition of nuclear weapons must be viewed as a life and human rights issue and as a moral imperative. As Archbishop Wester urged that we should work in solidarity with one another by quoting Einstein's words, science and religion are inextricably conjoined, and science or religion alone without the other would be lame, blind, dangerous and weak. Likewise, the Church needs to build solidarity and partnerships. Archbishop Wester pointed out from the introduction of his speech that the road to nuclear disarmament is a 'collective road' built upon our perseverance and productive relationships. In addition, he named the formal partnership that the dioceses of Santa Fe, Seattle, Hiroshima and Nagasaki established to work on nuclear disarmament in Northeast Asia "the solidarity between the U.S., Korea, and Japan's Bishops' Conference to promote peace on Northeast Asia" and suggested that we broaden this partnership to include other dioceses.

At this point, I would like to propose a plan to extend the partnership of 'the U.S., Korea, and Japan's Bishops' Conference to promote peace

on Northeast Asia' to regions such as the 'Chinese Regional Bishops' Conference' of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Vatican City State is the only European country with full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. As a result of the People's Republic of China (PRC; China) joining the UN as the only legitimate government of China in 1971, Taiwan lost its UN representation to China, lost its seat as a UN member state, and call itself an 'orphan in the international community'.

In the current landscape of international politics based on the “One China” principle, a position that PRC is the sole legal government of China, Taiwan is not entitled to sign the TPNW or other international treaties for nuclear disarmament as a ‘legitimate government.’ In addition, Taiwan has diplomatic relations with only 13 countries including the Vatican City, and most of the other countries are Latin (central and south) American and Caribbean countries with many Catholics, such as Haiti, and Guatemala. Tsai Ing-wen, the president of Taiwan (Democratic Progressive Party) was inaugurated in 2016 and announced a nuclear phase-out policy, and the policy of achieving ‘Nuclear-free Homeland’ by 2025 was implemented by the legislature of Taiwan (Legislative Yuan) passing the ‘Amendments to the Electricity Act’ in January 2017. However, in a referendum held in July 2018, the Taiwanese people have voted against the government’s policy to phase out the use of nuclear energy by 2025, and thus the timeline “by 2025” was deleted in the amendment of the law. Nevertheless, with the nuclear phase-out movement in Taiwan gaining momentum, there have been cases where nuclear reactors under construction have been shut down, indicating that there is a possibility of Taiwan sharing and disseminating its transition of energy policy in terms of construction and operation of NPPs to neighboring countries, through linking with citizens of neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church in Korea and Japan has been running a committee on NPPs or organized a pilgrimage of peace. Since Blasio Hyun-dong Park and Rev. Ichiro Mitsunobu, who have the experience in these areas, also take part in the later session in this Forum, I would like to ask them about the cases and achievements they have experienced to date through their activities, and the possibility of partnership with other regions such as Taiwan, during the roundtable

discussion.

Another suggestion from Archbishop Wester is to pressure governments of South Korea, Japan, and Australia, under the so-called the nuclear umbrella (extended nuclear deterrence) of the U.S., the countries who have not signed or ratified the TPNW, to send observers to future Meetings of State Parties to the TPNW. The mounting tensions and news of war between Russia – Ukraine or Israel – Palestine remind us of the dangers of using nuclear weapons not only for the specific situations of the applicable countries but also in terms of international security policy. The military, political, economic, and social structures are already in the process of development on the premise of possessing nuclear weapons, and there seem to be more advocates of arguments that returning to the era before possession of nuclear weapons would be more dangerous and that banning of nuclear weapons is nothing more than an idealism. In order for nuclear powers, such as the U.S. and Russia, and countries with security policies based on nuclear deterrence, such as Korea and Japan, to undergo transition to nuclear disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons, international solidarity must be built from all walks of life, including civic groups, Catholics, various religions, and researchers. We can never reach the goal of nuclear disarmament by the voice or efforts of Pope, the Vatican as a single state, and the Catholic Church alone.

Furthermore, I also value the importance of “building relationships” as Archbishop Wester highlighted in his message. In March this year, the ‘Final Document of the Synodal Continental Assembly of Asia’ (Synodality: In Greek, the term means walking together, journeying together or the method of walking/journeying together or living and working together toward a common goal), submitted to the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conference (FABC), pointed out that although Asia is the largest continent in terms of geography and population, accounting for 30% of the world, Christianity is only a minority (Catholics are about 3.31% of the Asian population, and only 0.335% in Japan).

The report also points out that although the proportion of participation of women is rather high in church activities, their voice is not listened to

properly, and furthermore, the role of the Church as a bridge-builder to initiate and engage in interreligious dialogue is emphasized. It is repeatedly stressed in the Final Asian Synodal Report that the Church must make ‘bridge-building’ efforts for peace, reconciliation, justice and freedom open to inclusion, advocate care and protection for ecological environment of the earth, which is our ‘common home’, and ‘listen to’ people from all walks of life and with different opinions.

After I learned of the Archbishop’s proposal, I thought about what I could do as a Japanese citizen in order to protect the world as a ‘common home’ and improve and strengthen ‘relationships’ in line with his proposal. In Pope John Paul II’s Apostolic Exhortation *⟨Familiaris Consortio⟩*,” there is a quote from the bible, ‘Carry each other’s burdens’ (Galatians 6:2). For in-depth development of the ‘relationship’ of Japan, building solidarity with neighboring countries, differences in history and historical perception surrounding Japan’s colonial rule and the issue of post-war reparations are the notable obstacles. I also heard from a Japanese priest that sexual violence issues suffered by women, such as the comfort women problem, are difficult to cover and handle even in the church.

The U.S. and Japan also played their parts in the problem of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The two countries were belligerents in the Pacific War, and the U.S. was the leading contributor for disseminating the use of nuclear energy across the globe following President Eisenhower's speech 'Atoms for Peace' before the UN General Assembly in 1953, and Japan was actively involved in such activities. For example, Japan took the lead in bringing about the image change about nuclear power that ‘nuclear energy is safe’ by holding the Exhibition for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum in 1957 under the nuclear power promotion strategy of U.S. and Japanese government officials. In August this year, in the process of selecting two members of the deliberation committee (20 members in total, two-year term) for the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum exhibition to be held in commemoration of the 80th atomic bombing anniversary in 2025 by Nagasaki City, the co-representative of the 'Overseas Atomic

Bomb Victims Association,' a civic group of second-generation atomic bomb victims, was defeated. It was reported that the reason for the defeat was that he claimed, "If we do not let the people know that Japan is the perpetrator, not only will there be a backlash from people around the world including Asia, but any efforts of Japan for abolition of nuclear weapons will not be understood." Japan overlooked not only the anti-nuclear and peace movements, as well nuclear power plant issues within Japan, but also the issue of Korean atomic bomb victims, which resulted in 70,000 atomic bomb victims and 20,000 deaths. The problem came to light when a Korean victim support group reported to the Korean government in 1966, immediately after the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, and it was not until the early 1970s that treatment for Korean atomic bomb victims began in Japan.

When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957, Japan was elected as one of the 13 countries constituting the Board of Governors, the decision-making body of IAEA, and South Korea and Vatican also joined IAEA as of 1957. Although the Vatican calls for abolition of nuclear weapons, it has not expressed opposition to nuclear power generation, which is a peaceful use of nuclear energy. From the records related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Italy, a defeated country in World War II as in the case of Japan, we can see that nuclear energy, which had been once feared due to the atomic bomb issue, was then embraced with of the 'breeze of optimism' on the notion that nuclear energy is an energy source that positively contributes to advancement of human society, to the point that countries were afraid to be left out from the international relations surrounding nuclear energy. Due to this changed trend, national parliaments and governments around the world have taken the initiatives in supporting scientists and experts in this field and in utilization/application of nuclear energy.

In September 2021, South Korea was elected as Chair of the Board of Governors of the IAEA (1-year term) and in September 2023, the country was newly elected to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors, the executive vice president of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

was appointed as a Member of the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Energy (SAGNE). In terms of proportion of contributions from the member states of IAEA to the regular budget, Japan ranks third (7.758%), following the U.S. (25.101%) and China (14.505%), and Korea ranks ninth (2.476%). Accordingly, when it was announced in July this year that the plan to release the treated water from Unit 1 of the Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Power Station, Tokyo Electric Power Company, into the sea complied with international safety standards, questions were raised about the neutrality or objectivity of such decision. In the end, the IAEA's Japan-biased safety assessment on ocean discharge of the treated water was criticized by Russia and China for 'causing release of polluted water into the ocean', and actions such as 'complete embargo on Japanese seafood', 'tightened regulations on import of Japanese seafood', and 'request for disclosure of information about Japan'. The aftermath of this issue does not end in the form of a conflict between Japan and neighboring countries. In Korea and Taiwan, public opinions regarding Japan have been divided between the ruling party, the opposition party, and civic groups, resulting in social division, which turns into a seed of conflict within a region and society, rather than any progress toward inter-regional solidarity. I am no exception myself and also subject to this criticism. The professor who was my supervisor was a figure who prompted the former President Park Chung-hee to develop nuclear weapons, and the seniors in the lab conducted research on the Park Chung-hee regime's nuclear development issues and North Korea's nuclear development and reported and published the results, but they were in the minority in the academic community. I have studied the inaction toward or neglect of atomic bomb victims living in Korea by Japan or the international community, and the nuclear energy policies of South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan; however, my research was merely pointing out the negative burden of history borne by South Korea, the U.S. and Japan in a comfortable position such as presentations at academic conferences by experts, and I have not even had the courage to publicly deliver the problem to society and have remained silent for so long.

Archbishop Wester did not regard the 'Trinity Site' as the land of the

first ‘successful’ nuclear weapons test that human being has achieved or as the land witnessing dazzling accomplishments of science, as the US government did, but chose the difficult path of abolition of nuclear weapons together with the victims. I feel great awe and respect for the Archbishop's courageous decision and his activities in practice so far. As a mere citizen, I have no power to move the Japanese government. However, I would like to join in the footsteps of the Archbishop as a member of an activity that learns about the history of perpetration and complicity, such as wars and ethnic conflicts in the past, and dictatorial politics in Japan, acknowledges the wrongdoings, thereby making efforts not to repeat the same history. What really matters would be not to remain in the position of “Japan-the atomic bomb victims” but deeply reflect on and acknowledge the war and the unresolved problems of post-war reparations, listen to voices of people with different nationalities or positions on the serious consequences of nuclear power generation, learn from the history, and deliver the messages to society to realize our common goal of nuclear disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons.

Session 2

2023

Catholic Korea Peace Forum

Climate Crisis and Human Rights (Peace) on the Korean Peninsula

Climate Crisis in North Korea and Green Detente on the Korean Peninsula

(Jang-min Choo • Senior Researcher, Korea Environment Institute)

The Nuclear-phase out and Energy Transformation

(Sang-heon Lee • Director of Institute of Green Transformation/Hanshin University)

Economic Sanctions Repurposed for Peace, Denuclearization, and Human Rights

(George Lopez • University of Notre Dame Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,
Professor Emeritus of Peace Studies)


Bernhard Seliger • Resident representative, Hanns Seidel Foundation Korea Office

James Heenan • Office Representative, United Nations Human Rights Office

Blasio Hyun-dong Park • Abbot of Benedictine Waegwan Abbey, Apostolic Administrator of the
Territorial Abbacy of Tokwon

Climate Crisis in North Korea and Green Detente on the Korean Peninsula

Jang-min Choo (Senior Researcher, Korea Environment Institute)



Agenda

I . Diagnosis and Prospects of the Climate Crisis in North Korea

II . Climate Crisis in North Korea and Security Threats on the Korean Peninsula

III . Climate Crisis in North Korea and Green Detente on the Korean Peninsula

I . Diagnosis and Prospects of the Climate Crisis in North Korea

1. Key Facts About Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Climate Change Trends in North Korea

- Over the past 30 years, North Korea's average annual temperature has risen by 1.4°C (0.45°C per decade), exceeding South Korea's 1.1°C increase (0.36°C per decade). This notable increase is primarily observed in the coastal regions of Hamgyeong Province and the interior areas of South Pyeongan Province and Wonsan.
- During the same period, precipitation in North Korea has shown a slight decrease, although some areas have witnessed increases while others have experienced declines.

30-year (1981-2010) Trends in Annual and Seasonal Average Temperature and Precipitation Across the Korean Peninsula, South Korea, and North Korea

Category		Annual Value	Spring	Summer	Fall	Winter
Average temperature	Korean Peninsula	0.41**	0.25	0.24	0.49**	0.56**
	South Korea	0.36**	0.23	0.11	0.43**	0.57**
	North Korea	0.45**	0.28	0.39	0.52**	0.47
Precipitation	Korean Peninsula	25.87	10.34	28.07	-7.70	2.20
	South Korea	54.28	16.95	46.26	-11.85	1.99
	North Korea	-25.19	-3.20	-5.54	-3.24	-1.40


Note: Temperature unit (°C per decade), precipitation unit (mm per decade) (* for a confidence level of 95%, and ** for a confidence level of 99%)
Source: The Korea Meteorological Administration (2012), "The Climate Change Outlook Report for the Korean Peninsula," p.64.

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1. Key Facts About Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Climate Change Trends in North Korea

Spatial Distribution of Rate of Change in Average Temperature and Precipitation on the Korean Peninsula



Note: Temperature unit (°C per decade)
Source: The Korea Meteorological Administration (2012), "The Climate Change Outlook Report for the Korean Peninsula," pp.64-67.

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1. Key Facts About Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Key Facts About Natural Disasters

Frequent Climate Change-Induced Natural Disasters, Including Annual Events of Flooding and Droughts

- In 2020, the most severe flooding occurred in Gangwon Province and Hwanghae Province in North Korea since Kim Jong Un took office.
 - The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) reported 22 deaths and 4 missing, while the non-governmental project ACAPS reported 135 deaths.
- In 2021, heavy rains in Hamgyeong Province led to 1,350 refugee victims and caused damage to 4,000 hectares of agricultural land.

Flood damage in North Korea in 2021



Source: Yonhap News (August 5, 2021), "North Korea Faces Another Flood Once Again This Year...Jamsil and Subongpud," <https://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/view/P/202108050000004>, accessed on October 13, 2023; MBC News (August 20, 2021), "UN Reports Heavy Rains Caused 1,350 Flood Victims and Damaged 4,000 Hectares of Agricultural Land in North Korea," <https://mnews.mbc.com/news/2021/politics/article/20210820-34866.html>, accessed on October 13, 2023.


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1. Key Facts About Climate Change and Natural Disasters


Natural Disasters by Type (1991-2023)

- Natural disasters have caused 2,390 deaths and impacted more than 50 million people over the past 30 years.
- Droughts have affected more than 31 million people, while floods nearly 13 million.
- North Korea experiences an estimated annual economic loss of USD 262.5 million (1.8% of the country's GDP) due to natural disasters. Source: UNESCAP (2023), "DPR Korea Disaster Risk," <https://rrp.unescap.org/country-profile/PRX?paragraph-id=26753>, accessed on September 27, 2023.

Number of Deaths from Natural Disasters (1991-2023.09.24)



Number of Victims from Natural Disasters (1991-2023.09.24)




Source: EM-DAT (September 24, 2023), CEED/UCCoastal, Brussels, Belgium, <https://www.emdat.be>, accessed on September 26, 2023.

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1. Key Facts About Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Spatial Distribution of Areas Affected by Natural Disasters (1970-2021)


- Drought-affected areas: Pyeongan Province, Hwanghae Province, South Hamgyeong Province, etc.
- Flood-affected areas: Hwanghae Province, Jagang Province, North Pyeongan Province, etc.
- Areas Experiencing Flood Fatalities: South Pyeongan Province, North Hwanghae Province, Hamgyeong Province, Gangwon Province, etc.



Source: ESCAP Risk and Resilience Portal: An Initiative of the Asia-Pacific Disaster Resilience Network (2023), "DPR Korea Drought/Floods Post-disaster (D-DAT)(1970-2021), Total number of people affected/Total death," <https://rrp.unescap.org/regional-app/186r>, accessed on September 27, 2023.

1. Key Facts About Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Ranked 7th on the Long-Term Climate Risk Index (CRI)




Source: Sven Hammeling and David Eckstein (2016), Global Climate Risk Index 2016, Germanwatch, p.6, p.11, p.21.

2. Long-Term Prospects of Climate Change

Long-Term Prospects of Average Annual Temperature and Average Precipitation on the Korean Peninsula


- Analysis results under the four SSP climate change scenarios (SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5)
- Average annual temperature is projected to increase by +2.6-7.0°C in the late phase of the future (2081-2100) compared to current levels, with significant increases in northern regions.
- Average precipitation is projected to increase by +2-13% in the late phase of the future compared to current levels, with more substantial increases in northern regions.



2. Long-Term Prospects of Climate Change

Long-Term Prospects of Climate Extremes Index for the Korean Peninsula

- Analysis Results under the SSP low-carbon scenario (SSP1-2.6) and the SSP high-carbon scenario (SSP5-8.5)
- Extreme heat events are projected to increase compared to current levels, while extreme cold events are projected to decrease compared to current levels. These phenomena are more pronounced under SSP5-8.5.
- Both the amount of extreme precipitation and the number of extremely wet days are expected to increase. Specifically, maximum 5-day precipitation is forecasted to increase by 6.1mm in the early phase of the future and 41.0mm in the late phase of the future under SSP5-8.5. In addition, extremely wet days (R95p) are projected to increase by around 30% in the late phase of the future.



➤ North Korea is forecasted to face an annual economic loss of USD 279.9 million under the SSP3 1.5-degree scenario; USD 283.5 million under the SSP 2-degree scenario.

Source: UNISCAP (2023), "DPR Korea Disaster Risk," <https://rep.uniscap.org/country-profile/PRK#paragraph-id=26753>, accessed on September 27, 2023.

3. Characteristics of Natural Disasters and Diagnosis of Climate Crisis in North Korea

Characteristics of Natural Disasters in North Korea

- North Korea, with an extremely high CRI, faces severe vulnerability to flooding and landslides. Floods result in the highest number of fatalities in North Korea, and the country experiences significant annual risks of economic losses and human casualties.
- Droughts have the widest spatial impact, affecting the largest number of people. Drought-induced food losses have the most significant impact on human health and casualties.
- The frequent occurrence of natural disasters results from a combination of factors: frequent extreme weather events due to climate change, poor river management, absence of a preemptive system for natural disasters, forest and soil degradation, overexploitation of natural resources, and excessive use of land and water resources.

Climate Change Vulnerability in North Korea and Security Threats

- The long-term projections for average annual temperature and precipitation on the Korean Peninsula indicate a relatively high level of volatility in North Korean regions.
- In the long term, there is concern that North Korea will face increased risks and damages from natural disasters affected by climate change-related factors, such as rising average temperature, an increase in precipitation, higher sea levels, and more frequent extreme weather events. In particular, rapid warming in mountainous regions increases ecosystem vulnerability in alpine areas and jeopardizes water management systems due to reduced winter snow cover.
- Climate change vulnerability and frequent natural disasters, resulting in soil erosion and forest ecosystem degradation, are anticipated to lead to a vicious cycle of socioeconomic harm that includes diminished crop production, infrastructure failures, persistent food shortages, and economic hardship, along with social crises.
- North Korea is confronted with a persistent and impending climate crisis that is expected to result in substantial economic losses.
- North Korea's climate crisis poses a threat to peace and security, hindering the sustainable development of South Korea and the entire Korean Peninsula.

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II . Climate Crisis in North Korea and Security Threats on the Korean Peninsula

1. Identifying Sectors Affected by Security Threats

Sectors Affected by Security Threats Related to Climate Crisis in North Korea: Water resource, Coastal Zone, Ecosystems, and Energy

Climate Change Impact Specified in North Korea's Adaptation Measures Presented to the International Community

Sector	Climate Change Impact	Prioritized Adaptation Measures
Cross-cutting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in damages from natural disasters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening research capacity for adaptation to climate change Improvement of climate information service and observation network in DPR Korea Development of educational curriculum for negative impacts and adaptation options Capacity building for improving the community-based disaster management system Establishment of the early warning system in the major basins
Water resource	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decrease in water availability Deterioration of water quality Increase in frequency and intensity of floods, droughts and landslides 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduction of technologies for water pollution prevention and efficient water purification Capacity building for integrated water resources management in the major basins Establishment of systems for rational distribution and consumption of water resources Capacity building for management of reservoir and rivers
Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes in regions suitable for cultivation Changes in the length of growing season Decline in crop productivity Increase in damages from harmful insects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promotion of development and dissemination of advanced agricultural technologies coping with climate change Establishment of integrated and sustainable management system of arable soil Establishment of integrated system for prevention of harmful insects and weed management
Coastal zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coastal flooding Retreat of coastline Salt water intrusion Increase in damages from flood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity building for integrated management of coastal zone Construction of infrastructures such as seawalls and protective facilities in coastal zone Rearrangement of population and economic activities
Public health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in incidence of infectious diseases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening of hygienic and anti-epidemic work Strengthening of medical services related to the diseases caused by hot weather Establishment of database for various infectious diseases and sustainable monitoring system for diseases
Ecosystems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shift in the structure of biological communities Changes in the number and range of species Loss of habitats for species Increase in damages from forest pests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recovery of degraded forest and firewood forest management in community areas Control of forest pests outbreaks by climate change and integrated forest pest management Improvement of ecosystem conservation system in coastal zone of the Korea West Sea Improvement of management system for existing nature reserves

Source: Choo Jang-Min et al. (2019), "Developing a North Korea's Environmental Research Roadmap for the Sustainable Development of the Korean Peninsula: Laying the Groundwork for Ecological United Korean Peninsula for the Future by Conducting a Baseline Survey of North Korea's Environmental Status, Korea Environment Institute, p.22, Original Source: DPRK (2016), "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of Democratic People's Republic of Korea, UNFCCC," pp. 12-14.


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2. Security Threats in Water Resource

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Water Resource


- Poor access to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation facilities
- Substantial river water pollution in urban, industrial, and mining regions, and unregulated river development
- Reduced functionality due to ecosystem damage in river basins, insufficient river infrastructure, and the erosion of flood prevention capabilities

Status of Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation Access in North Korea



Source: UN (2019), DPR Korea Needs and Priorities, p.8.

Projected Areas of Embankment Failure in the Upper Daedong River and the Middle and Lower Habjang River and Daedong River



Source: Choo Jang-Min (2015), A Study on Inter-Korean Cooperation Plan for the Laesong River Restoration and Watershed Management (4th), p.63.

- Large-scale waterborne disease outbreaks and transmission are threatening the lives and health of North Koreans.
- Natural disasters have inflicted damage in regions prone to floods and droughts, resulting in food shortages and environmental refugees (defectors and migrants).
- Contamination of rivers and groundwater in major urban and industrial (mining) areas are posing a threat to the availability of clean drinking water and the lives and health of North Koreans.


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2. Security Threats in Water Resource

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Water Resource

- There exists a potential for reduced rice and maize production in western coastal and inland regions due to temperature and precipitation changes.
- Areas of South Hwanghae Province, South Pyeongan Province, and North Pyeongan Province, which cultivate 30% of the country's rice and beans are projected to experience up to an additional 3 months of severe drought each year by 2035.
- A rice yield failure is projected to occur more often, from once every 7 years to once every 5 years.

Changes in Probability of Crop Yield Failures



Note: Changes in the probability of crop yield failures for rice (left) and maize (right) in 2035-2040, compared to 2010-2030.
Source: Catherine Dale et al. (2021), Security and Climate Risk, Convergence Crisis in North Korea, Security, Stability & Climate Change, p.3.


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2. Security Threats in Water Resource

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Water Resource

- The risk of flooding arises in military facilities, residential, commercial, and transportation infrastructure, and agricultural facilities in areas prone to floods, and is exacerbated by deforestation.
- There exists a potential for internal societal conflict over the allocation of flood risk response resources and the placement of facilities and residents.
- There exists a potential for soil and water contamination due to hazardous radioactive substances and heavy metals from military facilities, including the Yeongbyeon Nuclear Facility, and industrial and mining facilities.

Extent for a 100-Year Flood by 2050



Note: The current (light blue) vs. 2050 (dark blue) extent for the 1-in-100-year flood for (A) the Yeongbyeon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, (B) Pyongyang, and (C) North Hwanghae Province. Developed areas (yellow) include land covered predominantly by buildings and other man-made structures.
Source: Catherine Dale et al. (2021), Security and Climate Risk, Convergence Crisis in North Korea, Security, Stability & Climate Change, p.4.

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2. Security Threats in Water Resource

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Water Resource

- North Korea manages and utilizes water resources through river diversion in the Imjin River and the Bukhan River.
- Water quality has deteriorated, and susceptibility to climate change has increased due to the development of the upper reaches of shared rivers and deforestation.



Source: Gangwon Province (May 25, 2021), "Basic Survey of Shared Rivers between North and South Korea in Gangwon Province and Plan for Their Efficient Use," presented at the 1st KEI Environment Forum 2020 - Cooperation Plan for Border Area and Shared Rivers, Korea Environment Institute, p.36, pp.39-41.

- ✓ Flood threats in the lower reaches of rivers in South Korea are heightened by frequent extreme weather events like heavy rains, unauthorized discharges from North Korea, and the instability of dams.
- ✓ North Korea's river diversion practices have led to reduced water flow in South Korea and increased the risk of droughts, amidst a decline in precipitation.
- ✓ Water pollution is being aggravated by development, deforestation, and soil loss.


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3. Security Threats in Coastal Zone

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Coastal Zone

- An anticipated sea level rise of 0.3m by 2050 is projected to pose a threat to 553,000 North Koreans.
- Major ports and naval bases in Nampo, Wonsan, and Sinpo face flooding risks.

Projected Coastal Sea Level Rise by 2050



Note: Each color represents the extent of projected inundation from present annual floods plus sea level rise by 2050 at (A) Nampo, (B) Wŏnsan, and (C) Sinpo.
 Source: Catherine Dal et al. (2021), Security and Climate Risk, Convergence Crisis in North Korea Security, Stability & Climate Change, p.6.


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4. Security Threats in Ecosystems


Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Ecosystems

- Biodiversity loss and habitat degradation are accelerated by the interactions between climate change, forest degradation, soil loss, and development.
 - As of 2018, forest degradation in North Korea covered 28% (2.62 million hectares) of the total forest area, representing a 4% decrease compared to 2018 (2.84 million hectares).
- Wildlife migration, which is linked to habitat degradation, is being affected as well.


North Korea Forest Map and Changes in Forest Areas



Changes in Forest Areas in North Korea



Soil Erosion Change by Water (%) Between 2015 and 2070



Source: Chosun Jang-Min (November 17, 2020), "Division of Environment Cooperation Between North and South Korea in the Post-Covid Era," presented at the 2020 Seoul Peace Dialogue.

Source: Park Hyeon (2021), "Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Inter-Korean Cooperation in the Context of Climate Change on the Korean Peninsula," Original source: DPRK (2019), "Included Nationally Determined Contribution of Democratic People's Republic of Korea," UNFCCC.

- ✓ The nature-based climate change adaptation capacity is under threat throughout the Korean peninsula.
- ✓ Livestock farming and agriculture are being threatened due to wildlife migration resulting from habitat loss and the transmission of diseases.
- ✓ In the course of resource development, there arises a risk of outbreaks and transmission of infectious diseases associated with climate change.


19

4. Security Threats in Ecosystems

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Ecosystems

- The risks of permanent migration and transmission of African swine fever (ASF)-infected wild boars would arise due to habitat reduction caused by climate change and development in Gyeonggi and Gangwon Provinces near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), posing security threats to the nation's animal protection system.
- Security threats to the nation's infectious disease control system would emerge. These threats include infectious disease outbreaks, significant mortality in North Korea, and disease transmission to South Korea, which result from the migration of zoonotic disease vectors associated with climate change-induced temperature and precipitation increases.

Detection Status of ASF-infected Wild Boars



Source: Ministry of Environment (November 14, 2020), "Outbreak of African Swine Fever in Wild Boars and Response Status (November 1-11)," p.1.


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5. Security Threats in Energy

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Energy

- Air pollution in South Korea has worsened due to increased coal power generation driven by rising energy demands influenced by climate change.
- The Imjin River's capacity as a water resource for hydropower generation has been strained due to the operation of hydropower plants for electricity in border areas.
- There are adverse effects on inter-Korean cooperation aimed at sustaining and expanding carbon-neutral renewable energy initiatives and mitigating emissions abroad.

Changes in North Korea's Primary Energy Composition for 1990-2018 (unit: %)



Source: Choo Jang-Min (2020), "The Green Transition of the Korean Peninsula and Inter-Korean Environmental Cooperation", as cited in Green Transitions: Values and Strategies for a Sustainable Ecological Society, p.336, Haeund Academy; original source Statistics Korea, North Korea Statistics Portal (2020), "Primary Energy Supply (Galery)".

- ✓ Public health security threats due to exacerbated air pollution
- ✓ Depletion of water resources in the Imjin River and the Bukhan River and threats to the hydropower energy security
- ✓ Adverse effects on the nation's carbon-neutral security


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5. Security Threats in Energy

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Energy

- North Korea experiences the world's highest mortality attributed to indoor and outdoor air pollution, standing at 238.4 per 100,000 population, which significantly surpasses South Korea's 23.2 and the global average of 92.4 (WHO, 2017).
- According to the 2017 Korea–United States Air Quality (KORUS-AQ) study, 9% of PM 2.5 concentrations in South Korea are influenced by North Korea (Kim Sun-tae, 2019), posing a threat to air quality and public health.

WHO-Estimated Annual Mean Levels of PM2.5 concentration ($\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$)




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5. Security Threats in Energy

Climate Crisis Issues and Security Threats in Energy

- A sharp decline in the flows of the Imjin River and the Bukhan River and reduced power generation in the Bukhan River system pose threats to water, energy, and carbon-neutral security.
 - Estimated inflow reductions of 29% (53% during the dry season) at the Gunnam Gauging Station and 29.7% (45.7% during the dry season) at Hwacheon Dam
 - A reduction of over 30% in power generation at Hwacheon Dam and a roughly 20% reduction in power generation at Chuncheon Dam compared to the period before the construction of Innam Dam



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6. Summary of Climate Crisis and Security Threats in North Korea

Key Security Threats by Sector

◆ Water Resource Sector

- ✓ A shortage of safe drinking water, frequent natural disasters endangering people's health, lives, and property, food shortages, and the emergence of climate refugees
- ✓ Exacerbated food scarcity resulting from reduced grain yields due to temperature and precipitation changes, and frequent droughts
- ✓ Constant exposure to flooding risks due to frequent extreme rainfall events, social conflicts over flood response, and contamination from military facilities
- ✓ Elevated risk of natural disasters including flooding and droughts at the shared rivers between North and South Korea, including the Imjin River and the Bukhan River, and the potential for conflicts over the use of water resources

◆ Coastal Zone and Ecosystems Sector

- ✓ Heightened flood threats in coastal areas and major ports due to rising sea levels
- ✓ Wildlife disease transmission threat resulting from wildlife migration associated with biodiversity loss and habitat degradation
- ✓ Threats to health security for animals and humans, including zoonotic diseases in border areas, and adverse effects on the water ecosystems of the Imjin River and the Bukhan River

◆ Energy Sector

- ✓ Heightened threat to public health security due to exacerbated air pollution
- ✓ Damages inflicted on agriculture and fishing as a consequence of water resource depletion and reduced hydropower generation at the Imjin River and the Bukhan River, and multidimensional security threats related to water resources, energy, and carbon neutrality

- The climate crisis in North Korea has evolved into a climate security concern not only for North Korea but also for the entire Korean Peninsula, including the border regions between the two Koreas.
- It is crucial to develop policies and response plans based on the recognition that this crisis represents a security concern endangering the sustainable survival and development of ecosystems on the Korean Peninsula and the lives of North and South Koreans.

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III. Climate Crisis in North Korea and Green Detente on the Korean Peninsula

1. Reflections on Climate and Environment Policy Toward North Korea

Climate and Environment Policy Toward North Korea: Green Detente on the Korean Peninsula

- ◆ Conventional security and reunification policies primarily focus on traditional security concerns aimed at reducing military tensions.
- ◆ **Green Detente** on the Korean Peninsula
 - The content and scope of security and unification policies have broadened to encompass non-traditional security matters, including environmental concerns, climate change, and natural disasters.
 - Given the recently increased prominence of non-traditional security issues, there is a growing need for a policy convergence between environmental/climate policies and security/unification policies.



Green Detente is a security and unification policy aimed at collectively addressing environmental and climate change issues, as well as natural disasters, within the Korean Peninsula and the broader region involving North and South Korea as well as key parties in North Asia. This policy seeks to reduce confrontation and tension between the two Koreas while promoting peace, coexistence, and unification by establishing an environmental community on the Korean Peninsula based on eco-friendly development and industries.

1. Reflections on Climate and Environment Policy Toward North Korea

Progress and Current State of Climate and Environment Policy Toward North Korea

Framework and Overview of Climate and Environment Policies Toward North Korea in Previous Administrations

	Lee Myung-bak Administration	Park Geun-hye Administration	Moon Jae-in Administration
National Vision	Climate change adaptation and energy independence	Establishment of the bedrock for a happy unification era	Peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula
Strategy	Effective greenhouse gas reduction	Establishment of a new Korean Peninsula toward a happy unification	Reconciliation initiatives between the two Koreas and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
Agenda	Low-carbon, green Korean Peninsula	Initiating small unification toward big unification	Envisioning a new economic map initiative for the Korean Peninsula and achieving economic reunification
Projects and Programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Restoring forests in North Korea - Promoting energy cooperation and creating the DMZ Eco-Peace Belt - Developing collaborative inter-Korean climate change response and mitigation strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promoting green economic cooperation - Conducting joint research in areas related to border regions, DMZ, Baekdu Mountain volcanic area * Establishing the DMZ ecology/peace park - Developing a new renewable energy complex in the Gaesong Industrial Complex 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DMZ ecological tourism belt - Building a community for life and safety (health and environment) on the Korean Peninsula - Fostering cooperation in forestry and the protection and restoration of natural ecosystems - The DMZ international peace zone * Listing the zone as a UNESCO Natural World Heritage Site * Hosting UN organizations and peace, ecology and cultural institutions

Framework and Overview of Climate and Environment Policy Toward North Korea in the Yoon Suk Yeol Administration: Reviving the Green Detente Policy

National Vision	A global contributor to freedom, peace, and prosperity
Pledge	Commitment to normalizing inter-Korean relations and creating a peaceful Korean Peninsula
Agenda	Normalizing inter-Korean relations and preparing for unification with the people (achieving the North-South Green Detente)
Actions	Promoting environmental cooperation, including a joint initiative for fine dust and natural disaster response: enhancing cooperation in forestry, agriculture, and water resources and advancing the DMZ Green Peace Zone

Source: Republic of Korea (July 2022), The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration's 120 National Tasks, p.158.

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1. Reflections on Climate and Environment Policy Toward North Korea

Limitations of Climate and Environment Policy Toward North Korea and Need for a Shift

- ✓ **The limitations of the functionalist approach and its effectiveness**
 - Previous administrations have employed the functionalist approach and adopted climate and environment policy toward North Korea as a subset of security and unification policy.
 - The potential for cooperation in climate and environment and the effect of tension reduction (spillover effect) is being questioned amid increased tension in the traditional security sector.
- ✓ **The limitations of the Green Detente policy due to the broadening of the security concept**
 - With the broadening of the traditional security concept, the limitations of the Green Detente policy have become apparent in the era of climate crisis and pandemics.
 - Fundamental questions are arising regarding the distinction between traditional and non-traditional security, the importance of weapons of mass destruction as a traditional security concern, the significance of COVID-19 and natural disasters as non-traditional security concerns, in addition to the criteria for assessing risk levels. (Kim Sang-jae (2021), "The Emergence of COVID-19 and the Global Politics of Vaccines," presented at a seminar jointly hosted by the Korea Environment Institute and the Institute of International Studies, SNU.)
- ✓ **The escalating risk of the climate crisis in North Korea**
 - The climate crisis has emerged as a substantial threat to climate security and sustainable development for both North and South Koreans, and the ecosystems of the Korean Peninsula, across various sectors, including water resource, coastal zone, ecosystems, and energy.



- **The necessity of a transitional approach to addressing North Korea's climate crisis**
 - An approach that acknowledges North Korea's climate crisis as a key security factor and an independent variable that poses a threat to the sustainability of the Korean Peninsula
 - A "security and life protection" approach that encompasses both the Korean people and natural ecosystems of the Korean Peninsula

2. Establishment of Response System for Climate Crisis in North Korea

Measures for Response System Establishment: Elevating "Climate Security" to a Central Element of North Korea Security Policy and Establishing a Proper Response System

- **Establishing and operating the "Task Force on North Korea's Climate Crisis"**
 - Establishing and operating the "Task Force on North Korea's Climate Crisis," which comprises officials from ministries and relevant local governments, under the Office of National Security
 - Developing short-, medium-, and long-term measures along with emergency response plans to address security threats arising from the climate crisis in North Korea
 - Establishing a monitoring and response system for flooding and water resource management along the Imjin River and the Bukhan River, along with wildlife disease control and infectious disease prevention
- **Conducting surveys, monitoring, and predictions of the climate crisis in North Korea**
 - Comprehensive and long-term surveys, monitoring, and forecasting of the climate crisis in North Korea
 - Creating and operating a database on North Korea's climate crisis
- **Establishing a response system for natural disasters in North Korea**
 - Restoring a communication channel to prevent water damage along the Imjin River and the Bukhan River and establishing a collaborative water resource management system
 - Taking immediate action in response to natural disasters in North Korea and providing humanitarian aid, including food, medicine, and recovery supplies
- **Establishing an international cooperative network to address the climate crisis in North Korea**
 - Building an international network and data-sharing system to respond to the climate crisis in North Korea
 - Creating an international cooperative network led by international organizations to address the climate crisis in North Korea


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3. Carbon Neutrality Strategy for Korean Peninsula

Developing the "2050 Carbon Neutrality Program for the Korean Peninsula"

- ◆ Exploring proper measures as a strategic option and crucial breakthrough for normalizing inter-Korean relations and achieving peace
- ◆ Designing an international program involving North and South Korea, the U.S., relevant countries, and international organizations, while creating an exemplary case for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (inter-country cooperation)

- North Korea's estimated GHG emissions for 2022 amount to 81.293Mt CO₂eq/yr.



- **North Korea's GHG reduction plan**
 - Business-as-usual (BAU) emissions for 2030 amount to 218 million tCO₂e (updated NDC report for 2030).
 - The country aims to achieve a carbon reduction of 114.6 million tCO₂e, a 52.4% reduction compared to the BAU, utilizing the domestic capacity and international support.

North Korea's GHG Reduction Plan (North Korea NDC Report)

	2016 NDC Report	Updated 2019 NDC Report
BAU for 2030	187,730,000 tCO ₂ e	218,000,000 tCO ₂ e
Reduction scenario 1 (domestic capacity)	14,997,000 tCO ₂ e (8%)	35,800,000 tCO ₂ e (16.4%)
Reduction scenario 2 (international support)	60,547,000 tCO ₂ e (32.25%)	78,800,000 tCO ₂ e (36%)
Domestic capacity and international support	75,547,000 tCO ₂ e (40.25%)	114,600,000 tCO ₂ e (52.4%)


Source: UNFCCC, "Annex: Nationally Determined Contributions of Parties, Republic of Korea," https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/annexes/Annex%20A/Annex_A_2016.pdf, accessed on September 30, 2023.

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The Nuclear-phase out and Energy Transformation

Sang-heon Lee


(Director of Institute of Green Transformation/Hanshin University)




1. Climate Crisis and Energy

Changes in global surface temperature relative to 1850-1900

a) Change in global surface temperature (decadal average) as reconstructed (1-2000) and **observed** (1850-2020)



b) Change in global surface temperature (annual average) as **observed** and simulated using **human & natural** and **only natural** factors (both 1850-2020)




Source: IPCC the Sixth Assessment Report (2021.8.9) pp.41

● **IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6 Working Group I)**


- Human influence on the climate system is unequivocal. The average global surface temperature increased by 1.09°C compared to the pre-industrial temperature (reference period: 1850-1900).
- The IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (published in 2018) reported that if then-current rate of temperature rise continued, the global warming could reach 1.5°C, the temperature benchmark set for limiting the effects of climate change, as soon as 2030-2052. Now, AR 6 announces that we face the risk of reaching the 1.5 mark 9-12 years earlier.
- WGI developed five illustrative scenarios (SSP1-SSP5), taking into factors such as population growth, economic growth, land use, energy use and mitigation efforts.
- In all scenarios considered, global surface temperature is likely to increase by 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level before 2040 and 1.6°C by 2060. For more long-term projection, global warming is predicted to decline back to 1.4°C under the very low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenario based on the assumption of active mitigation efforts. However, the long-term estimates are expected to vary over a wide range, depending on the scenarios and modelled pathways.

Future emissions cause future additional warming, with total warming dominated by past and future CO₂ emissions




Source: IPCC the Sixth Assessment Report WGI (2021.8.9)

● **Excessive use of fossil fuels**




● Portion of energies in greenhouse gas emissions



Source: WWF, 2020, <Response to the Global Climate Crisis: Focusing on the expansion of Renewable Energy> Report

● Transition from fossil fuels

Figure S.7. The bulk of emission reductions: Renewables and efficiency
Energy-related CO₂ emissions, 2010-2050



Based on IRENA analysis

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA), 2020, *Global Renewables Outlook: Energy Transformation 2050*, p.33

- Energy-related CO₂ emissions reduction potential (2010-2050) through renewables and improving energy efficiency
- Depending on the scenarios, the estimate from Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario is 43Gt in 2050, 33Gt by Planned Energy Scenario (PES), and 9.5Gt by Transforming Energy Scenario (TES)
- Main sectors of energy transformation: Buildings, transport, district heating, power generation, industry

2. The Nuclear-phase out and Energy Transformation

● Nuclear power plant operation/construction/closure status by country (2022.4)

IAEA 발표 기준 국가별 핵발전소 운영·건설·폐쇄 현황 (2022.4)

핵발전소 운영 국가							
국가명	운영중	건설중	폐쇄	국가명	운영중	건설중	폐쇄
1 미국	93	2	40	18 핀란드		5	
2 프랑스	56	1	14	19 헝가리		44	
3 중국	54	16		20 슬로바키아	4	2	3
4 러시아	38	4	9	21 대만		3	
5 일본	33	2	27	22 아르헨티나		3	1
6 한국	24	4	2	23 아랍에미리트	2	2	
7 인도	231	6		24 몽고리아		2	4
8 캐나다	19		6	25 브라질	2	1	
9 우크라이나	15	2	4	26 남아공		2	
10 영국	11	2	34	27 멕시코		2	
11 스페인	7		3	28 쿠마니아		2	
12 벨기에	7		1	29 벨라루스	1	1	
13 독일	3		30	30 이란		1	1
14 스웨덴	6		7	31 솔로몬도마		1	
15 체코	6			32 네덜란드		1	1
16 파키스탄	6		1	33 아르메니아		1	1
17 스위스	4		2				
핵발전소 신규 건설 국가				핵발전소 폐쇄 국가			
국가명	운영중	건설중	폐쇄	국가명	운영중	건설중	폐쇄
1 터키		3		1 이탈리아			4
2 방글라데시		2		2 리투아니아			2
				3 카자흐스탄			1
합계					441	52	199

- As of 4th of April 2022, there were 441 nuclear reactors in operation in 33 countries across the globe.

- At present, 52 new power reactors are under construction in 17 countries including the Republic of Korea (RoK), and 199 reactors were shutdown in 22 countries, including the cases of Germany and Taiwan's national policy to phase out nuclear power.

- The mean age of operation for nuclear power plants (NPPs) worldwide is 31.4 years.

- Considering that the world's nuclear fleet is aging, the number of NPPs to be shutdown for decommissioning is expected to increase.


Source: Energy Justice Actions, 2022. <Climate crisis: turning back to nuclear power is not a solution>

● Current status of nuclear power plants in East Asia


There are 129 NPPs in operation or under construction in East Asia (China/Japan/RoK/Taiwan). Worldwide, there are 493 NPPs in operation or under construction, with MPPs of East Asia accounting for 26.1%.



● Current status of nuclear power plants in East Asia



- Current status of earthquake zones and nuclear power plants around the world



- Dangerous nuclear energy

- Ensuring operational safety of NPPs is indeed an important issue. However, the real hazard posing threats to public health and life comes from the radioactive waste.

- Radioactive waste is typically classified into low-level waste (LLW), intermediate-level waste (ILW), high-level waste (HLW) (spent nuclear fuel), depending on the level of radioactivity of the waste

- There is a clear difference in the management (storage, treatment and disposal) methods between LLW/ILW and HLW.

- Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) is one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known to human civilization. Interim storage refers to storing SNF safely for several decades (40-80 years) to cool down after withdrawal from the reactor before final disposal. Final disposal refers to permanent isolation of SNF from human environment or biosphere altogether, which requires geological safety corresponding to the early period in the geological time (over 100,000 years). In the step of disposal of SNF, the radiotoxic waste is disposed of in deep geological formations at depths of 500-1000m. Within the current level of technology advancement in radioactive waste management, most countries prefer a deep geological disposal system: Finland and Sweden have secured a suitable site of HLW repository. However, questions remain: Can we truly secure long-term geological safety for longer than 100,000 years? How can we handle the problem of possible contamination during transportation of the hazardous waste?

- Regarding our continuous search for the perfect method of SNF disposal, **the fact is that a full and proper, scientific verification for such a method is yet to be achieved.** When researchers first started the investigation, it was expected that by the time the initial nuclear reactors or NPPs come to the end of their lifespan, groundbreaking development of technology would solve the problem. → Some people compared NPPs **with aircraft cruising without a place for landing or a mansion without a toilet.**

- Dangerous nuclear energy

Fukushima nuclear power plant accident (March 11, 2011)



<Reference> Release of radioactive waste water from Fukushima

- The “nuclear-contaminated water” refers to the water used for cooling damaged reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP from the Fukushima nuclear accident: in this process, up to 180 tonnes of radioactively contaminated water is produced daily.
- In the case of release of the radioactive water into the ocean, it is highly likely that the radioactive contaminants would flow into the seas of East Asia, especially the RoK. Research based on simulation predicted that cesium, a radioactive element, would reach the sea off Jeju Island within 200 days and the East Sea as early as 280 days.
- Japan claims that if the radioactive water undergoes treatment through the advanced liquid processing system (ALPS), a multi-nuclide removal system, release of the water would not pose problems to public health. ALPS is a water filtration and purification system, which allows removal of most of the radioactive materials apart from tritium. Tritium is a natural radioactive isotope of hydrogen present in the coolant for nuclear reactors. When tritium enters the body, it can replace normal hydrogen atoms and cause alteration in gene expression levels. When tritium replaces hydrogen in a cell nucleus, beta-ray irradiation from tritium causes damage to DNA molecules, and tritium may disintegrate to helium. Additional damage can be induced through breaking of chemical bonds by nuclear transmutation to inert helium since helium has the property of being unstable as a DNA constituent.
- Tritium is not the only radioactive element causing problems. ALPS fails to operate effectively as a processing technology for some of the other radionuclides. In fact, even Japanese media reported that ALPS has a limited performance duration for the removal of radioactive elements such as ruthenium or strontium.



Estimated diffusion route of radioactive materials from Fukushima nuclear power plant by NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) © NOAA

Source: <https://www.sciencetimes.co.kr/news/>

<Reference> The history of nuclear-contaminated water dumping and discharge

- According to <Uranium Atlas: Factors and data about the raw material of the Atomic Age> (2020), which presents summary and analysis of statistics published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), up until 1993, countries including the USSR, the UK, Switzerland, the US, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands admitted that they had dumped nuclear waste into the ocean. At this time, the dumped nuclear waste included not only ILW or LLW but also nuclear reactors from submarines or SNF.
- In 1993, the Russian Federation admitted their practice of dumping liquid and solid nuclear waste, amounting to about 20,000 tonnes into the East Sea since the 1960s through the publication of a white paper.
- In 1975, the London Convention on Marine Dumping came into force but even with the convention, only the ocean dumping of HLW was banned and ILW/LLW were still allowed to be dumped into the ocean.
- In the Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Convention held in November 1993, with Japan taking the initiative to call for an international accord in this issue, an international treaty of banning ocean dumping of all types of nuclear and industrial waste was adopted and entered into force. At this time, although RoK was one of the countries directly affected by such dumping practices, the country could not even join the adoption of the amended treaty because of the conflicting interests in the matter of industrial waste dumping.
- Although the London Convention covers the prohibition of ocean dumping of all types of nuclear waste, it does not cover discharges from land-based sources. The release of radioactive water by Japan involves releasing the contaminated water into the ocean through tunnels of land-based facilities: thus, the act falls under the category of "discharge".
- Shortly after the Fukushima NPP disaster, in April 2011, Japan released low-level contaminated water of 12,000 tonnes into the ocean, leading to a protest of the RoK government. In 2013, high-level radioactive water of 300 tonnes was leaked from a defective storage tank. IAEA rated this event as Level 3 according to the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) (For reference, the Three Mile Island accident in the US was rated at Level 5 and the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Plant itself at Level 7).

● Is it true that Nuclear Power produces significantly less GHG Emissions than other energy sources?

- ✎ IAEA: As a result of assessment over the course of the life cycle of NPP, nuclear power is one of the energy sources of the least GHG emissions, along with hydropower and wind power.
- ✎ A paper by Prof. Benjamin K. Sovacool, University of Sussex, the UK: GHG emissions from nuclear power facilities such as NPPs are actually higher at 1.4~288gCO₂eq/kWh (mean: 66.08g), compared to other energy sources such as wind power (9~10g), hydropower (10g), and solar power (32g).

● Opportunity Cost of Nuclear Power

- It takes at least 12 years from site selection, design, construction, to operation an NPP (The Basic Plan of Long-Term Electricity Supply and Demand of RoK is established every 15 years, reflecting this condition of timescale). In comparison, it takes 2-3 years for wind turbines, and 2-3 months for solar power plants.
- We have around 5 to 6 years until the tipping point of reaching 1.5°C. It would be much more effective in terms of time and cost to invest the resources in renewables rather than in NPPs.
- As of 2014, carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity generation process worldwide accounts for 42% of total emissions. Of these, 73% comes from coal-fired power plants. The share of nuclear power generation in the total power generation is approximately 10%.
- If we were to replace 1/3 of fossil fuel-based power plants with nuclear power, approximately 923 more units need to be built based on the capacity of the new generation NPP of 1.4GW. This implies that from 2020 to 2050, one NPP must be built every 13 days. To replace half of the existing fossil fuel power plants, one NPP must be completed per week. Considering that two-thirds of the 447 NPPs currently in operation across the globe will be decommissioned before 2050, the number of new NPPs that must be built has to increase even more than the above figures (illogical/nonsensical).

● Nuclear Power, not robust against the Climate Crisis

- ✎ On 5th of July 2020, heavy rainfall and storm caused unexpected halting of the operation of Unit 4, Turkey Point NPP in Florida, the US. On August 10 in the same year, Duane Arnold NPP in Iowa had to cease operation with power cut due to extensive storm damage to its cooling tower.
- ✎ Temperature is another issue with NPPs. Use of coolant is essential for nuclear power generation, and these plants are usually located along the coast or by the riverside. The water used as a coolant circulates through a nuclear reactor and the cooling water with the temperature increased by about 7 to 9 °C is discharged. This raises the water temperature around the discharge outlet, which in turn causes serious problems in the aquatic ecosystem. To prevent such environmental impact, the only options are to reduce the electricity generated by NPP or cease the operation altogether. France, one of the countries with a high share of nuclear power, imports electricity during the summer season because of this very reason that the country halts the operation of NPPs to prevent an increase in water temperature.
- ✎ When Europe was hit by heat waves in 2003, 19 NPPs in France had to cease operation or reduce electricity output. Rising air temperature also causes overheating inside the NPPs. Recently, in July 2019, when a heat wave swept across France, the operation of two units of Golfech NPP (southern France) was halted due to concerns about coolant overheating.
- ✎ Moody's Investors Service, a credit rating agency, predicts that the climate crisis will pose additional risks to the operation of the NPPs in the U.S. It is analyzed that heat waves, the issue of stable water supply, flooding and hurricanes will increase the operating costs of NPPs, ultimately increasing the credit burden considering market conditions. ²⁰

● Nuclear Phase-out Policy of the Moon Jae-In Administration

- On June 19, 2017, at a ceremony marking the permanent shutdown of Kori 1 NPP, a roadmap based on nuclear phase-out policy was announced with a statement, "this occasion marks the first step toward the nuclear-free country, and a great transition toward safe Korea in true sense."
- Targets were presented that by 2030, the percentage of nuclear power in total electricity generation will be reduced from the current level to 30% to 18%, coal from 39% to 25%, and the share of LNG and new and renewable energy will increase from 22% to 57%.
- The year set to achieve 0% nuclear power was 2083, based on the consideration that the lifespan of Shin Kori Unit 4 and Shin Hanul Units 1 and 2, which are under construction, is 60 years.
- Referring to the energy mix of Germany, the proportion of nuclear power in total electricity generation was similar to that of Korea at 30%, but the country declared that they would achieve 0% by 2030. Taiwan put a stop to building of a nuclear power plant, which had a 98% completion rate at the time, and announced that the proportion of nuclear power, which was 13.7%, would be reduced to 0% by 2025.

● Abolishment of the Nuclear Phase-out Policy and heading for the 2nd Renaissance of Nuclear Power by the Yoon Suk Yeol Administration


- Working group plan by the General Administration Committee for the 10th Basic Plan of Long-Term Electricity Supply and Demand (August 31, 2022)
- By 2030, the share of nuclear power to be increased from 23.9 to 32.8%, and renewable energy to be reduced from 30.2 to 21.5%.
- 12 units of NPPs (10.5 GW) will continue in operation until 2036, 6 units of NPPs (8.4 GW) to be completed
- Renewable energy budget in 2024 set to KRW 604.5 billion (42% decrease from KRW 1.049 trillion in 2023)
- SMR budget in 2024 set to KRW 33.28 billion (8.6-fold increase from KRW 3.87 billion in 2023)
- Allocation of 2024 nuclear ecosystem support project budget: KRW 11.2 billion (an increase from KRW 8.89 billion in 2023)
- In 2024, new budget allocation for KRW 100 billion in financial support for the NPP ecosystem and KRW 25 billion in NPP export credit is planned.
- ❖ The scale of new domestic solar power plants projects was reduced by 17%, compared to the previous year.(2.5GW)
- ❖ The President of the RoK pledged to donate an additional \$300 million to the Green Climate Fund (GCF; RoK as the 'Green Ladder') in aid of countries vulnerable to climate change (New Delhi, G20 Summit).

The Yoon administration announces “Carbon neutrality and green growth” plan (2023. 3. 21)

(온실가스 감축목표 조정 내용)
(단위: 백만톤CO₂e, 길쭉는 2018년 대비 감축률)

구분	부문	2018	2030 목표		
			기존 NDC (21.10)	수정 NDC (23.3)	
배출량 합계		727.6	436.6 (40.0%)	436.6 (40.0%)	
배출	전환	269.6	149.9 (44.4%)	145.9 (45.9%)	
	산업	260.5	222.6 (14.5%)	230.7 (11.4%)	
	건물	52.1	35.0 (32.8%)	35.0 (32.8%)	
	수송	98.1	61.0 (37.8%)	61.0 (37.8%)	
	농축수산	24.7	18.0 (27.1%)	18.0 (27.1%)	
	폐기물	17.1	9.1 (46.8%)	9.1 (46.8%)	
	수소	(-)	7.6	8.4	
	탈루 등	5.6	3.9	3.9	
	흡수	흡수원	(-41.3)	-26.7	-26.7
	제거	CCUS	(-)	-10.3	-11.2
	국제감축	(-)	-33.5	-37.5	


<그림 1> 한국의 온실가스 감축 목표 (단위:100만t CO₂e)



Source: [ISSAJournal, \[Zoom In\] The Yoon administration's blueprint for achieving carbon neutrality and green growth revealed \(issajet.com\)](#)

Source: [Will the industry really welcome the carbon neutrality plan? - SteelN \(stain.co.kr\)](#)

Basic tasks for energy transition



- Improving energy system efficiency
 - What we need are functions made possible by energy and materials.
 - Should focus on end-use demand rather than energy supply and find ways to provide this efficiently.
 - i.e. Improving home insulation, car sharing system
- Electrification of (almost) everything
 - Transition from internal combustion engines to electric mobility
 - For heating, use heat pumps rather than combustors
 - Should consider risk factors (risks associated with rare metal mining)
- Exponential growth of new renewable energy
 - Need government subsidy to lower the initial investment cost of renewable energy compared to the fossil fuels costs
 - Renewable energy prices will become cheaper than fossil fuels in the coming decades and will surpass fossil fuels in the industrial sector

Source: Sandrine Dixon-Decleve, Owen Gaffney, Jayati Ghosh, Jorgen Randers, Johan Rockstrom, and Per Espen Stoknes, translated by Sunyoung Choo & Mijung Kim, 2023, *Earth for All: A Survival Guide for Humanity* (Bona Liber Coop LTD., 2023) 209-222

● **Energy decentralization and energy autonomy**

- From a large, public enterprise to a community-based enterprise



Source: <http://m.ecomedia.co.kr/news/newview.php?ncode=1065601098360921>

Nuclear power sector in RoK

- Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP)/ Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)
- Large-scale public enterprises
- Operations aimed at increasing supply and generating profits



- Middelgrunden Offshore Wind Farm, Denmark*
 - Local Utility Company/Cooperative
 - Sustainable energy supply
 - Owned and controlled by citizens of Copenhagen
- * The world's largest offshore wind farm built in 2000, consisting of 20 wind turbines (40MW in total capacity). The wind farm supplies about 4% of Copenhagen's electricity. 50% of the share is owned by Middelgrunden Wind Turbine Cooperative (45,000 members), the rest of the share is owned by local utility company.



Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middelgrunden>

***Thank you for
your listening!***

Economic Sanctions Repurposed for Peace, Denuclearization, and Human Rights

George Lopez

(University of Notre Dame Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,
Professor Emeritus of Peace Studies)

Introduction

In this paper I outline, and provide some supporting details, for why sanctions have failed to constrain the nuclear developments within and hostility from DPRK. I will argue that the goals of peace, denuclearization, and increased human rights in North Korea can only be achieved through a new strategic vision developed and operationalized jointly by ROK, Japan, and the United States. I will provide some suggestions for the contours of this strategic vision in the political world. I conclude with an analysis of how and why a distinctively Catholic moral vision and voice that supports new political and conciliatory mechanisms is needed, especially when popular opinions in each of our nations may run contrary to these recommendations.

As I begin, I offer my sincere thanks to the organizers of the 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum for inviting me to participate in this smart and much-needed regional dialogue. I am honored to offer my reflections at this panel today and to have these ideas published by the Forum.

In offering these recommendations I am also keenly aware that I do not live in this region, nor have I had to endure the growing threat of a country which seems impervious to sanctions economic devastation of its own society. Thus I am looking forward to critical commentary regarding my recommendations.

Similarly, as an analyst of North Korean sanctions evasion and determined nuclear ambitions, I know that the past few years have been especially difficult to envision any real transformation in the stubborn determination of the Kim Jong Un regime to attain robust nuclear and military capabilities which combine with new

threats and even constitutional reform about nuclear doctrine within the system. That such nuclear prowess is key to the perception by the regime of its survival adds to the other factors to make this case of North Korea uniquely challenging to models of proliferation reversal.

Thus, the analysis I acknowledge that policy research about sanctions success can be rightly questioned as, “but that won't hold for North Korea”. Nonetheless, I feel some obligation to lay these policy and strategic arguments before you because this unique forum can bring a new moral logic to give these opportunities, which have not been tried as vigorously in tandem in earlier times, a renewed purpose.

As all assembled here know well, no serious set of recommendations to achieve more peace and reconciliation and less militarism and nuclearization in this region, can deny that the regime of Kim Jung-un has little or no interest in halting his current nuclear program, either in doctrine - now embedded into the DPRK constitution - or in practice. Thus, there are multiple and deep dimensions of disagreement and threatening war actions which make our conflict an intractable dispute between the DPRK and ROK, and DPRK and many nations from neighbor Japan to the United States half a world away.

As a scholar-practitioner of peace research and economic sanctions, and who in has dealt intensely with United Nations attempts to control nuclear developments in North Korea, I argue that the current escalating military tensions and missed opportunities over the past eight years must be addressed more creatively, more consistently, and especially with a new process that leads to a less threatening regional environment that must precede any hope for larger goals like improved human rights in DPRK or its denuclearization.

The dramatic increase in the nuclear capability of the DPRK since 2015 in both real nuclear weapons and in delivery systems via medium and long-range missiles means that Kim Jong Un, despite his partial diplomatic isolation and the bite of punishing sanctions, is in a stronger position to resist peace negotiations with Seoul or Washington or others than ever before. Whether it be his bargaining with Seoul over multiple issues unique to the North-South agenda, or with the U.S. regarding mutual denuclearization, we all know that Kim will be unmovable in the short to medium term. DPRK will not yield on its nuclear weapon systems before major other concessions, especially in sanctions, occur and a significant

new security arrangement guaranteed.

Talking Realistically About Sanctions

Because I am asked to comment on the prospect for sanctions attaining both denuclearization and the improvement of human rights in North Korea, my first claim is that we need to think and talk more realistically about sanctions. In large part, the ineffectiveness of sanctions, including their overuse, and sometimes misuse, has occurred because decisionmakers fail either to be convinced by—or know—the data-based realities of when, why, and how sanctions might attain their various goals. In the absence of accessible guidance on how to maximize the success of sanctions, decisionmakers tend to focus on the target's vulnerability to sanctions, rather than these well-established parameters for sanctions' success.

Those imposing sanctions, and the various policy and academic experts that analyze them as they are imposed and implemented, should hold themselves more accountable regarding the fit between the tools they are about to impose, or reauthorize, and the evidence of what works. And there is a special need for this when the case at hand is the most dangerous and difficult, trying to coerce or persuade the DPRK regime to end its nuclear program.

To begin, then, at best, sanctions achieve some level of compliance from their targets in only 20 to 30 percent of cases, with such compliance occurring within two and a half years. Thereafter targets develop a hardened position due to their on-going absorption of enduring costs to their economy.

Historically, multilateral sanctions (i.e., United Nations and regional organizations) have been more successful than autonomous, with the U.S. often taking the lead in United Nations sanctions from 1990 through the 2000s. But international cooperation in the Security Council has now eroded, and the U.S. resort to autonomous sanctions has exploded in the past decade. Stronger and more effective sanctions tend to involve shared imposition with the European Union and other likeminded partners.

Sanctions work best when they are one of several diverse tools employed to achieve a clearly defined and consistent set of policy goals. Sanctions fail to achieve changed target behavior for a diverse set of reasons, but most often when the policy goals are diffuse and unclear to the target, or unrealistic in

making multiple demands, some of which expand over time. The latter is referred to as ‘moving the goalposts.’

Sanctions which are excessively punitive in the trade and banking sectors by aiming to achieve the economic isolation or collapse of the targeted leadership never succeed in obtaining the political concessions and policy changes they intended. But their results over time are a hardened position by the targets and near irreversible negative effects on all elements of socio-economic life of ordinary citizens. Contributing to the failure of such sanctions is low or zero diplomatic engagement with the target that often accompanies the tightening of broad, sectoral sanctions regimes.

Beyond the generalizations across various sanctions regimes, aimed at various issue areas, I now come to the two areas of major concern in the region regarding North Korea – can sanctions improve human rights treatment by the Kim regime of its own citizens? Will sanctions finally lead to DPRK denuclearization?

Regarding human rights, neither unilateral nor multilateral sanctions have ever toppled a brutal dictator. Nor have sanctions, by themselves, ever forced rights violators to desist in their worst acts. But sanctions imposed to address serious human rights violations, can play a significant prevention role and have sometimes stifled some atrocities through asset seizures and travel bans on a range of mid-level economic and political enablers, such as bankers, industrialists, and police and military networks that strengthen and shield brutal dictators. Human rights sanctions have their most consistent success when imposed selectively to assist the emergence and staying power of new democracies.

These general factors for success of human rights sanctions, unfortunately, show why sanctions for human rights improvement are not having – and will not any time in the foreseeable future – any impact on the Kim regime. It has such a dominant grip on central control of North Korean life that the rights abuses abound and are built into the fabric of the political and social order, without protest. And sanctions that do impact the nation have little influence on government elites who rely on Kim for support, that they reciprocate – there are no independent bankers, industrialists, and police and military networks that are targets of sanctions as they don’t exist per se.

To constrain nuclear non-proliferation, sanctions cannot bludgeon a nation into giving up what it considers its most powerful security protection. But nuclear reversal has been negotiated with Iran in 2015, and in Ukraine, South Africa, Brazil, and Libya in the nineteen eighties and nineties. This occurred when sanctions were reasonably successful in denying money and material critical to the development of arsenals. But these sanctions were soon superseded by very active intense problem-solving diplomacy that promised new security guarantees and was accompanied by a versatile array of economic inducements from several nations, with special attention to the sanctions relief which the targeted nation has long demanded.

New Directions for De-escalation for Peace and Security

The cornerstone in this new approach will be greater diplomatic engagement and creativity from Washington, Seoul and Tokyo in all matters related to DPRK and peace and security in the region. And the same time, leadership by the US to appraise and invite China to join other regional actors in this forthcoming process must be bold and necessary. Such overtures to North Korea and China flow from the redefined vision and engagement role of the United States sketched below.

The first order of business in declaring a re-engagement directly between the US-DPRK is to propose to DPRK our openness to leader-to-leader summit diplomacy, or otherwise to solve our collective search for de-escalation measures on the peninsula and in the wider region by other diplomatic meetings. In addition, each state should set up lower-level working groups that begin tackling the difficult issues that require consistent, shared work to reach incremental agreements from which national leaders can build further. Such continuing work can also increase the space for DPRK and ROK similar level working groups, especially regarding reviving some cooperative arrangements that have been rejected or simply fallen away due to Pyongyang's isolation.

Secondly, the US must recognize the failure of maximum pressure sanctions to produce denuclearization or improve DPRK behavior. To ensure that such a major policy shift has bargaining utility in dealing with the North will demand a whole new process framework in which such changes and sanctions relief can stimulate

more movement towards peace. I believe the basic contours of such a new process exists if we polish off and adapt a bit the framework which laid the groundwork for the early nuclear arms control treaties between United States and the then Soviet Union some six decades ago. This inventive communication and action-reaction process is called the Graduated and Reciprocated initiatives in Tension Reduction [GRIT]. The GRIT framework invites rival parties, however serious their disagreements, to acknowledge even minimally, their shared interest in war avoidance and an openness to negotiated settlement of their disputes. And it establishes how early, unilateral concessions can provide incentives to a stubborn foe to undertake even the slightest reciprocal concession.

But here is the key: to move beyond the intense distrust and hostility among foes, GRIT requires one of the parties to assume unilateral leadership in the process of de-escalation. The time for such U.S. leadership has come. As the lead nation in a GRIT strategy, the U.S. would announce forcefully and without ambiguity or qualifiers, its commitment to end our security crisis and nuclear standoff with DPRK without resort to war or military first strikes. The US would then demonstrate the seriousness of that declaration by any number of alternative actions:

- (1) declare its willingness to end the armistice status with DPRK regarding the Korean War in favor of a full-scale treaty of peace ending the war.

- (2) mobilizing regional and global humanitarian agencies to provide various forms of health and food sector goods and relief long delayed by COVID and DPRK isolation.

- (3) calling the concerned nations of the region – China, Russia, South Korea and Japan – to a summit meeting designed to outline a multifaceted peace strategy to entice the North Koreans to discuss such proposals.

These proposed actions would be followed by an invitation to Kim Jong Un to respond to this new initiative in kind, and to provide a sign of its own interest in defusing tensions by joining a multiparty dialogue about a more secure future for all.

Recognizing the problem involved when long-term enemies try to halt hostilities, GRIT posits that if Pyongyang does not reciprocate to any of these initial positive moves, the U.S. and its allies should propose and enact a fourth and even a fifth

initiative/concession toward reconciliation. These actions could entail Seoul and Washington dramatically curtailing or postponing planned military exercises in the region that have developed to counter DPRK missile tests over the past two years.

Both the literature and the practice regarding those conditions that lead to reversing nuclear proliferation involve sanctions playing a role in the denial of critical material for developing a robust nuclear program and dramatic economic injury through a range of financial and sectoral sanctions. But these studies, as well as the actual state practice of reversing nuclear weapons, emerges from a movement away from sanctions toward sanctions relief and economic incentives for nonproliferation. Further, such policy actions lead to real progress if there is strong, consistent, and engaged diplomacy of the target nation with neighboring states and other adversaries that have imposed sanctions. This diplomacy must demonstrate how it aims to provide new security guarantees to the sanctioned country that are based neither in sanctions punishment, nor in continued external military threat. The prospects for full economic integration into one's region and the wider world are meant to show that nonproliferation and decreased militarism has its rewards.

There is much more to detail regarding why a dramatic shift in policy has the best chance of producing results of dramatic de-escalation of the current military and security tensions that has not been attained otherwise. The new concessions oriented approach makes more production of weapons and the prospects of uncontrollable crisis that lead to their use far less likely than current total sanctions approach.

The Catholic Perspective is Necessary for New Diplomacy and Policy to Succeed

What can a forum like this add to the strategic and policy choice vision that I advocate? I believe that as Catholics, we must offer some new arguments that have not entered the public sphere of debate regarding denuclearization of this region and regarding changing North Korean behavior. I would add that we must do so because the practical ideas and their ethical rationale goes against the tide of current military and political thinking. I offer some of these below.

The first assesses that the current nuclearization and militarization of the

peninsula by all sides indicates that nuclear deterrence now appears as the only way to stand against North Korea's threats. I think we must take the strong and clear stand with Pope Francis 's vision that the production, the presence, and the potential use of nuclear weapons is strictly prohibited by any moral measure that cares for the planet or its people.

Secondly, while we might express some empathy for decision makers in our respective countries for increasing defense capabilities and demonstrating them to DPRK through recent enhanced military exercises, we can move beyond these since they bring new tensions and uncertainties. The absence of engaged and serious diplomacy, complete with new opportunities for inducements to de-escalation of tensions with the North, must be pointed out as short-sighted and provides an opportunity for the Kim regime to see the militarization now occurring as the only meaningful policy.

Again, confessing my outsider status, I think back 40 years ago to the insightful, if not fully courageous, commentary the US Catholic Bishops provided in their letter on the nuclear dilemma called the Challenge of Peace. Faced with an embedded character of the Cold War nuclear logic that justified the weapons and threats of both the Soviets and ourselves, the bishops were told by policymakers that nuclear deterrence had the best moral outcome by ensuring there would be no war that used these weapons.

Seeing the dramatic escalation of tensions in the early 1980s, the bishops decided to inject a new moral sensibility into the virtually unquestioned deterrence logic. They stated that the only ethical justification for this balance of terror between the superpowers was that it was temporary as a means of stability, AND was meant to be a building block for reduction - and ultimately an end - to the nuclear arms race. They stated clearly that they were giving, “a strictly conditioned moral acceptance to deterrence...”.

It may very well be time to ask the leaders of our three countries where the continued escalation of military exercises and the quid pro quo responses to North Korea's threats being matched by our own will lead us over time. I suggest that the time is ripe to state the equivalent of what the US bishops did in 1983, that is, the increased escalation of military exercises in East Asia receive ‘a strictly conditioned and temporary moral acceptance’ that cannot be maintained unless creative and aggressive diplomacy is engaged on the peninsula to bring

more lasting stability and peace, beginning with a de-escalation of such exercises.

There are other aspects of Catholic insight that can be injected into the policy dialogue far beyond the use of sanctions. The operation of Catholic peace building approaches across the world accepts the notion that when we build peace from ongoing war, or the kind of hostility manifest in this peninsula, we do so by sitting down - not with Saint Francis, Mother Teresa, or Gandhi as our bargaining partners.

Rather we sit with murderers, would be genocide leaders, corrupt officials, and the like, due to our understanding that we live in a world of sinners. And, if there is to be peace it must be made even with the shortcomings that hateful enemies and scoundrels bring to the table. The notion that we will sit to negotiate with the North Korean regime only if it first shows itself to be different than it is, or even at this stage pledge to be so, should not be a condition for negotiating the perilous state of the region is something we must challenge at its core.

So too our Catholic peace building perspective understands the futility of thinking that the new dimensions I suggest, will produce an array of immediate rewards. There can and should be reduction in threat dynamics, pauses in military exercises, missile launches, and nuclear development. But to engage in nuclear reversal will take decades. In fact, since we are dealing with a 70 year conflict which has recently worsened, we should not expect the development of full peninsula peace to come in the next few years. But the commitment to attain that peace, like the commitment to live out a life worthy of a coming Kingdom based on Christian principles, is the unique vision and patience that the voices in this room can bring. Enduring the terrible legacy of seven decades on the edge of war, only makes sense if we have clarity and hope about the initial and incremental steps ready to go in approaching the next 70 years. We can take new actions and engage in them in the virtues of hope, love of the planet, and love of our enemies.

In concluding, I argue that of the role of the Catholic Churches in the three countries in this Forum must generate a long-term vision to persuade our fellow citizens that the fundamental argument for our actions is grounded strongly in the Gospel and the Theology of Peace. We do so because, having witnessed 70 years of failure of strategic logic of sanctions and military policies that flow from it, we

embrace new thinking that must guide action. And those action are supported by our commitment in word and deed to the moral imperative to avoid war, to end nuclear weapons, and to repair relationships even among very contentious and incompatible national systems.

Bernhard Seliger

(Resident representative, Hanns Seidel Foundation Korea Office)

First of all let me say how happy and honored I am to participate in this great conference and great pilgrimage. There is only one way to reconciliation, as we learned in Germany, and that is to forgive and be forgiven (as once the Polish bishops wrote in their letter to their German colleagues in the height of the Cold War), and to meet and exchange views; and this is a very auspicious and timely event, to meet each other, to try to understand each other despite all the difficulties it brings, and to discuss for a better future. Having said that as an academic I would not want to be too cheap and just dwell on mutual understanding – academic debates have to be free and sometimes maybe even painful, apart from the important human understanding of each other. All three papers were very much of interest to me, since I work in the field of cooperation with North Korea – we started our program in North Korea in 2003, and worked on numerous issues, among them economic development and trade, clean development and renewable energies, sustainable forestry and organic agriculture as well as nature protection, wetlands and migratory birds.

So, let me start to discuss the presentation by Choo Jang-Min of the Korea Environment Institute (KEI) on the ‘Climate crisis in North Korea and the Green Détente on the Korean Peninsula’. Thank you so much for assembling so much interesting data on these issues, the maps and data are indeed very helpful. Here, I would like to add some observations:

(1) Macro-climate versus micro-climate

North Korea has been surprisingly active in embracing the climate change agenda of the UN, which includes signing all of the relevant documents and conventions and participating in many activities. However, to some extent, blaming climate change for natural disasters and food problems in the country has been a “scapegoatism” – indeed, most of the current problems with flooding, for example, are rather not induced by climate change, but by the

destruction of forests, the lack of a healthy tree cover, as well as the tilling of inappropriate lands close to rivers prone to flooding in the rainy season. North Korea often refers to climate change to explain calamities in other countries and in their own country; this helps them to escape from an honest discussion of the lack of protection of the environment, in particular forests, in their own country. While there has been – fortunately – since 2012/ 2014 a vigorous afforestation campaign (the results of which, however, still have to show), but this has not been linked, at least in public propaganda, to past mistakes of domestic policies.

(2) ASF and other natural disasters and diseases

The same is true for ASF. North Korea did acknowledge since 2019 the existence of ASF, blaming it not incorrectly on China, which imported it. But the spread among pigs in DPRK and then wild boars, which also brought it over the border, is a result of the way, pigs are fed and raised in North Korea (essentially by families, sending them roaming around to search for food which then also led to infections of wild boar). The South Korean answer, to my understanding, is also not very elaborate – it seems that in many places wild boar is just killed and put under the earth by soldiers, often without even testing them. A lot of money has been spent on fences, but the effectiveness of them seems to be low.

(3) As for the green détente on the Peninsula, everyone clearly can see that currently, this is politically impossible. Even in the best times of détente (like until 2007 and from 2018–2019), there have been very few projects, but a myriad of plans has been made. All of these were well-made but led to few or mostly no results at all. Instead, energy should currently be devoted to think how an “indirect green détente” can be reached by supporting multilateral cooperation or cooperation through third countries or partners. Admittedly, this would be much less attractive politically, but it would help to improve North Korea’s environment in a time, when direct cooperation is impossible.

Regarding the issue of nuclear power versus renewable power, in the very interesting paper by Prof. Lee Sang-Heon of Hanshin University, allow me to take a comparison from Germany. The reason is that Germany – as the first and until now only country in the world – after the accident of Fukushima did abandon nuclear power and this year shut down the last four nuclear power plants. These had been running, as all others, all in all very smoothly over the decades. Naturally, there have been problems here and there, but nothing that did not

also happen to other power plants. And this is not only a German experience, but one which also exists in almost all other countries, with the exception of the Soviet Union, which indeed saw a nuclear worst case with the Chernobyl accident. This, by the way, heavily influenced public opinion in Germany ever after, even if the technology of Chernobyl and the circumstances of the accident did not at all compare well. Germany in 2011 embarked on a twelve-year plan to phase-out nuclear power, and at the same time on a 25-year plan to phase out coal power. Germany used (and uses) still a lot of extremely dirty lignite mined in open-pit mines, not so much for the efficiency (which is extremely low), but due to regional policy considerations – among others, open pits were concentrated in the Brandenburg and Saxony areas of East Germany, where unemployment was very high. Since 2011, Germany began to extend the network of gas power stations and by and by became heavily dependent on Russian gas (and oil). This should work as a “bridge technology”, until solar and wind power would be strong enough to cover all of Germany’s power needs. This had to stop for political reasons with the start of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. And here the German dilemma became clear: While there had been a massive increase of wind and solar power, and in good times (of the day, and of the year) almost up to 100 percent of electricity could be produced by green energy, this was not the case of bad times – the *Dunkelflaute* (doldrums), when there was no solar energy, like at night and in winter, and no wind energy. But the “bridge technology” gas was missing. So, Germany began again to use dirty coal power, since for ideological reasons the Green Party, in power since 2021 in a coalition government with the (market) liberal and the Social Democratic Party, did not want to restart or extend the life of nuclear power. The result is one of the dirtiest energy mixes in Europe, and at the same time the highest energy prices. In particular, small businesses like bakeries, small craftsmen etc. cannot cope with high energy prices and thousands of them closed their shops. By now, Germany is the only industrial power in the OECD experiencing a recession – this is 100 percent the result of home-made mistakes, in particular the absurd energy policy. And, even if the production capacity of wind and solar power is increased tenfold, which for political reasons and environmental reasons seems impossible, the problem of the doldrums would still exist.

With this background, Prof. Lee, allow me to be highly skeptical on the urgency and feasibility of nuclear phase out. In my opinion, nuclear power is the only

power allowing mankind as a whole to achieve lower carbon emissions, and maybe one day carbon neutrality. There are several aspects to this:

- Countries like Germany and South Korea are simply too small to have any decisive impact on carbon emission. It would be much better to work with big emitters like India, the US and China to reduce the carbon footprint there. This is not possible in my opinion without nuclear power.

- Clearly, there is a danger in nuclear power (but, looking at accidents, in particular deadly accidents, not at all bigger than in other power producing technologies). Therefore, research for better (and maybe, smaller and modular, more universally usable) technologies is necessary. One of the greatest problems is that countries like Germany, once at the forefront of nuclear research, now put a lot of money and effort in ways to make wind and solar more efficient, with no measurable impact on world climate.

- Finally, yes, there is the problem of military abuse of nuclear power. This however, already happened in many countries and is not likely to increase with more civilian use of the technology. It is for politics to find an efficient answer to proliferation, not by forbidding civilian use, that this problem can be addressed.

Finally, last but not least some words about the paper of Prof. Lopez on sanctions. To some extent I sympathize with his main argument that sanctions have a) failed to achieve what they were designed for, namely in particular denuclearization of North Korea (actually, sanctions, at least all the important ones, were not designed to address human rights, though this was maybe implicit in the idea of maximum pressure for regime change), and b) might be morally indefensible, if hitting the population instead of the leadership. Our own operation to some extent is suffering from sanctions, which make it not impossible, but difficult to import many necessary inputs for example in agricultural or forest projects, when it is politically often impossible for our DPRK partners to ask for exemptions which put them domestically as well as internationally in a spotlight.

However, not imposing sanctions and unilaterally withdrawing sanctions are two very different issues. Currently, North Korea's adversaries have very few things they can offer North Korea: sanctions relief and a peace treaty are among them.

Just giving this away, not as a result of negotiations, but of upfront goodwill, seems to be completely misreading North Korea. North Korea always argued from a position of strength, even on the height of the famine. We misread them mostly because our honorable, but mistaken view is that North Korea like any other country would be interested in improving its economic situation, i.e. the situation of its citizens. Nothing is further from truth. North Korea's leadership is extremely cynical about this; Kim Il-Sung, when visiting Erich Honecker in East Germany in the 1980s, said something to the effect that only hungry communists are good communists, advising against to high living standards (we only know this through the opening of East German archives). Clearly, North Korea fears the effects of another large-scale famine for the stability of its regime, but they are not at all interested in feeding its population. With such a regime, any upfront niceties would not change it a bit to opening.

This does not mean that there is nothing we can do. Let me enumerate a few things we can do despite of sanctions, and which might actually work:

- Provide scholarships for North Koreans in (not-too-technical) areas, like social sciences, environment etc. North Korea has an interest in modern education, and from the Soviet Union we know how crucial even a handful of foreign-educated officials was in the original formulation of the perestroika.

- Similarly, provide internships on all levels, in particular in cooperation with international organizations or associations; AFOCO (in forestry), Ramsar Regional Center (for environment and wetlands), the Tsinghua center for hazardous chemicals (on brown environmental issues) are just three coming immediately to my mind in the field I know; there are thousands of other possibilities in all fields of activity.

- Creating mechanisms for very targeted, but feasible and administratively easy sanctions exemptions; this could include de minimis rules (e.g. for small-scale equipment of USD 2000 and less), this could also include the urgently-needed creation of a clean banking mechanism with North Korea; this could be negotiated at the UN level, for example, or with China, and could include a "clean bank" on both sides particularly for humanitarian issues and the use of international actors in North Korea

Personally, I even have doubt that North Korea would allow some of these

things on a larger-scale, simply because the country has a very single-minded goal – regime survival – and is rather indifferent to anything else. However, offering them to improve their international status (North Koreans are snobs and are very much hurt by their pariah status) and giving them selected economic incentives might work to some extent. That said, larger carrots like the famous peace treaty, the end of joint military exercises, leader-to-leader meetings should really be the result of negotiations with some tit-for-tat. (I hesitate to argue theologically here, being not a theologian, but Jesus dined with the sinners when they showed their willingness not to sin anymore, not condoning the sins, but rather the repentant sinner; and North Korea is far from this position...).

James Heenan

(Office Representative, United Nations Human Rights Office in Seoul)

UN Human Rights Office Seoul

**Climate Crisis and Human
Rights (Peace) on the Korean
Peninsula**

James Heenan



UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

The role of the UN on DPRK and these issues

- maintain international **peace and security**;
- develop **friendly relations** among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights;
- achieve **international co-operation** in solving international problems;
- promote **respect for human rights**; and
- *And this one is often forgotten: To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends*



Human rights, nuclear weapons and power

- UN Human Rights Committee:
 - Indiscriminate therefore **is incompatible with respect for the right to life** and may amount to a crime under international law.
 - States must take all necessary **measures to stop the proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction
 - States must pursue in good faith **negotiations in order to achieve the aim of nuclear disarmament**
- UN General Assembly July 2022:
 - *Recognizes the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a human right*



Sanctions

- The **Panel of Experts** on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK (established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009))
- International human rights law requires Member States imposing sanctions to **take into account the rights of the people** and reduce any adverse impacts of sanctions on the population.
- But **DPRK should provide access to UN monitors** and provide adequate and credible data and other evidence to enable an accurate analysis of the human rights and humanitarian impact of sanctions



Some final thoughts ...



- On the **links** between human rights, peace, security and non-proliferation
- On peace and justice: **accountability and engagement**
- On the risks of **instrumentalisation**



Blasio Hyun-dong Park

(Abbot of Benedictine Waegwan Abbey, Apostolic Administrator of the Territorial Abbacy of Tokwon)

As the Chairman of the Ecology and Environment Commission of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea, I completely agree with the presentations of Mr. Jangmin Choo, who spoke about the climate crisis and Green Detente in North Korea, Prof. Sangheon Lee, who spoke about denuclearization and energy transition. I also deeply resonated with the words of Professor George Lopez, who said, "We can take new actions and engage in them in the virtues of hope, love of the planet, and love of our enemies" to build peace on the Korean Peninsula, even though it is different from the ecological and climate crisis. This is because the issue of extreme climate change today is also an issue of human rights and peace.

I just returned from Japan last week, where I participated in the Korea-Japan Denuclearization Peace Pilgrimage (Oct. 13-19, 2023), held annually between Korea and Japan since 2012 after the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster. Last year, we visited the nuclear power plants in Gori and Wolsong on the east coast of Korea, and this year, we saw the Tsuruga, Mihama, Oi, Takahama, and Monju nuclear power plants west of Nagoya, Japan, where there is a high concentration of nuclear power plants. We also visited the Sendai diocese in Japan, and we approached up to 4 kilometers from the accident site of the nearby Fukushima nuclear power plant and visited the Onagawa nuclear power plant north of Sendai. Everywhere I went, I met local activists who have spent 40-50 years fighting for denuclearization activities and have in-depth discussions about their thoughts on denuclearization and the reality of Korea and Japan.

I would like to thank Prof. Lee for his presentation on the issue of denuclearization and energy transition, in which he cited a number of data to show that nuclear power is not a fundamental alternative to energy transition because of its many problems (cost, safety, waste, nuclear proliferation) and the

fact that it cannot be a real alternative to energy transition at a time when the world is on the path to denuclearization and the global energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine.

Statistically, countries that rely heavily on nuclear power have a lower share of green renewables, and countries with a higher share of green renewables have a lower share of nuclear power, which shows how unrealistic it is to promote nuclear power to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In paragraph 2 of his Apostolic Exhortation *⟨Laudate Deum⟩* (October 4, 2023), Pope Francis reiterated the need for urgent action when he said, "Eight years have passed since I published the Encyclical Letter *Laudato Si'* ... Yet, with the passage of time, I have realized that our responses have not been adequate, while the world in which we live is collapsing and may be nearing the breaking point."

129 nuclear power plants are operating or under construction in China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, accounting for 26.1% of the world's nuclear power plants. When we see the dense clustering of nuclear power plants in South Korea and Japan, and the discharge of contaminated water into the ocean from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, we realize that nuclear power plant accidents are not just a problem for one region or country, but a significant risk factor for the East Asian region. On April 15 this year, Germany joined the ranks of nuclear-free countries by shutting down the last three operating nuclear power plants. While humanity has enjoyed the benefits of nuclear energy for more than 60 years, approximately 260,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants are being managed ad hoc basis with no safe place to store it. We need to keep high-level nuclear waste for at least 100,000 years, which is not easy. It is not intergenerational justice to postpone nuclear waste to future generations and maintain the benefits we enjoy today.

Thank you for Mr. Choo's presentation on the North Korean Climate Crisis and the Korean Peninsula Green Detente, and for highlighting the specific challenges and crises that the climate crisis will pose for North Korea. I understood that what can be categorized as elements of 'emerging security', such as environment, food, and health, are topics of importance that cannot be ignored even when compared to 'traditional security.'

In the '110th National Priorities' announced on May 3, 2022, the Yoon administration declared that it would promote environmental cooperation with

North Korea, including joint response to fine dust and natural disasters, and that it would 'implement the inter-Korean green détente' by strengthening cooperation in forestry, agriculture, and water resources and promoting green peace zones in border areas. However, I wondered if this was too simplistic an approach in this era of climate crisis. North and South Korea are experiencing steeper climate warming than the global average. North Korea, in particular, is classified as a vulnerable country to climate change, as shown in various studies, and is affected by floods, typhoons, and droughts every year. It is also one of the countries with the highest economic and human losses due to extreme weather events. In addition to the climate crisis, during the hardship march of the 1990s, the trees in the mountains were severely cut down to meet food and energy shortages, which has led to increased natural disasters.

I heard that the North Korean authorities have also recognized that these natural disasters could become a critical security issue since 2019, and the number of articles mentioned in the Rodong Sinmun Newspaper has increased. Therefore, the view of establishing an international coordination system in response to the climate crisis as an independent variable and key factor that threatens the security of the Korean Peninsula seems to be a very necessary task today.

The food shortages, water shortages, collapse of social infrastructure, economic poverty, health and sanitation crises, and increased likelihood of conflict caused by climate change are not simply limited to their respective problems but are also issues that can be expanded into the category of human rights and peace. I believe that when North and South Korea can work together to overcome the climate crisis, an important step will be taken to build sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Round Table

2023

Catholic Korea Peace Forum

Peace of Northeast Asia and the Church

Alexis Mitsuru Shirahama • Bishop of Hiroshima

Simon Ju-young Kim • Chairman of the CBCK's Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People

Gerard F. Powers • Coordinator, Catholic Peacebuilding Network

Jude Lal Fernando • Trinity College Dublin (University of Dublin)

Hyejeong Oh • Sisters of Our Lady of Perpetual Help

Jennifer Joy Telfer • Peace Catalyst International

Co-hosted by the Catholic Institute of Northeast Asia Peace and the Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Korea, the 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum was held from October 26 to 29. Conference 1 on October 27 was concluded with a roundtable discussion session, focusing on the topic of Peace and the Church in Northeast Asia.

Prior to the roundtable session, speakers and discussants dealt with the themes of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons and the Arms Race and Climate Crisis and Human Rights (Peace) on the Korean Peninsula in Sessions 1 and 2 earlier that day.

The panels of the roundtable session included: Bishop Alexis Mitsuru Shirahama of Hiroshima Diocese, Japan; Bishop Simon Ju-young Kim of Chuncheon Diocese, Korea and the President of the CBCK Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People; Gerard F. Powers, Coordinator of Catholic Peacebuilding Network; Professor Jude Lal Fernando, Trinity College Dublin in Ireland; Sister Zephaniah Hye-jeong Oh, Sisters of Our Lady of Perpetual Help; and Jennifer Joy Telfer, Peace Catalyst International.

What is the role of the Catholic Church for the peace in East Asia surrounding the Korean Peninsula? The following are the voices of panels who have been building peace in their places in Korea, the United States, and Japan.

Bishop Alexis Mitsuru Shirahama (Bishop of Hiroshima Diocese, Japan)

All over the world, distrust is in a vicious cycle. The root lies in the wrong choices to build true peace. Humanity has accepted the far-fetched theory based on 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth' but Christ showed us a nonviolent way of loving your enemy to cut off the armed force. We must acknowledge that with armed force, peace will never be built.

What can we, the Church, do to ease tensions and build peace in Northeast Asia? What would be the first step? In my opinion, it is to actively promote the 'Partnership for a World Without Nuclear Weapons'. We, the faithful who believe in the peace taught by Christ, shall make the culture of peace with the belief that Christ is always with us.

In a long-term perspective, we need to patiently organize dialogue channels and show a flexible attitude, in a way that does not isolate North Korea. Although 70 years have passed, we are facing a situation where war may trigger again. The war would be obviously a nuclear one, and future wars are also likely to have damages several times that of Hiroshima, even a possibility of extinction of the human race. The Catholic Church's principle of nonviolence must not be bent.

Bishop Simon Ju-young Kim (Bishop of Chuncheon Diocese, Korea, and the President of the CBCK Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People)

Listening to the speakers before me, I thought about what we, the Catholic Church, did in the past and what we should do in the future to guide the world in a better direction in God's eyes. Just as the light shines brighter when the darkness is thicker, the current reality may be the thick darkness. I reflected on myself and thought that the Church should play a role, in everyone's respective positions and in solidarity, for this generation, who do not know war, understands war properly.

Korean society senses vague threats of war crisis, but it doesn't consider them seriously. Was there ever a question within us to ask what we should do to maintain peace when we are divided, yet peaceful? The Church should stay alert so peace must not be used by politics.

What we talked about nuclear weapons was discussed both within the Church's teachings and Encyclical Letters. The Church has answers. The question is how to unite in solidarity and implement them in reality. The teachings of the Church are directed not just to the ones in the Church community but to everyone in the world. And yet, do we, the faithful, know the teachings and answers? The role of the Church is to know what we need to do, to work them out in the world, and to share and stay in solidarity with the people of the world.

When it is the role of the Church not only to listen attentively to others, and to understand the needs of the heart, emotions, and the Holy Spirit, we must face North Korea with the same attitude and understand and empathize

with what they say in the encounter.

Gerard F. Powers (Coordinator, Catholic Peacebuilding Network)

In response to North Korea's provocations, the United States has not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons. But deterrence by arms to prevent war will now be unsuccessful. Although there is still various logic in the use of weapons to prevent and respond to war, NATO (collective defense for Western Europe security), which has relied on the collective defense and weapons system, has also failed to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine and has not promoted sustainable peace in Europe.

The Catholic Church is often confined to its own cocoons. I hope that this forum becomes an opportunity for international communities and organizations to bring about change and build peace among the 1.2 billion Catholic population in the world. One of the Church's deficits, in terms of peacebuilding, is that not enough Catholics consider that peacebuilding is integral to the Catholic faith. We need to expand the role of peacebuilding by using our respective roles, positions, identities, and jobs. The condition of peace activity is the deep conviction that peace is possible. And there is a need for pragmatic, sophisticated, and nonviolent commitment. The Church should integrate peacebuilding with reality.

Jude Lal Fernando (Professor, Trinity College Dublin in Ireland)

As the faithful, we should imagine what we can do in repentance. From the perspective of peace, we should look at real politics, or imperial politics, and we also need a political perspective from the eyes of faith. Each country sees social, political, and international relations in terms of balance of power. However, this can be overcome by a relationship based on faith.

Jesus sacrificed himself for peace. The peace of real politics may rationalize mass destruction, but the peace of Christianity is to find a lost sheep. Religious peace is a sacrifice.

The opposite of war is creativity, the opposite of love is fear. Hate can be created by fear. In dealing with North Korea, we don't necessarily have to

think about sanctions. Being able to yield and walking up to them as many times as possible is creativity. Fear is generated by politics, and you need to go beyond, encounter, and know each other's positions to overcome fear.

Sister Zephaniah Hye-jeong Oh (Sisters of Our Lady of Perpetual Help)

Our congregation also went through a bitter history of division and war. I remember separated families, victims of the Korean War, victims of the atomic bomb, and victims of the Israel war. It was very challenging to think about our role in these situations, but reflecting upon our identity gave me strength. We are Christians. Jesus Christ is our hope and peace. Even when we receive complaints, we must sign the petition for peace and speak up that we must live in a nuclear-free world.

North Korea has really changed a lot, but we still remember its most grim times. We should confess North Korea as a brother, not as a stranger, but we still see it from a hostile perspective. I think that the media played a significant role in this. The media should be responsible for preventing the general public from accessing proper information or news. When I visited North Korea, we offered prayers for the reconciliation and unity of the Korean people with the followers of the Catholic Church in North Korea at 9 p.m. I believe they still continue to pray with us at the same time.

Jennifer Joy Telfer (Peace Catalyst International)

How should we build trust? The United States is not purely a victim, nor is it purely an aggressor, but it carries both identities. To resolve North Korean conflicts, the U.S. must take a humble position. While growing up in a middle-class Protestant family in the States, I listened to Korean War veterans and did not question the military power of the United States. Until I learned about the history of the two Koreas, I did not realize how the United States played a role. It was arrogant and ignorant. But as I converted to Catholicism, I felt about the peace of Jesus. Jesus said to reconcile with his brother and become a servant to be the best.

We are deepening the wounds of North Korea through failed diplomacy. A

work for healing is needed for disconnected relationships. We have a tradition of penitence and confession. We must confess our sins. With that confession, we can forgive each other and restore trust in the process.

I've worked in different countries around the world, and I saw that violence does not end when the guns keep firing. Violence is never healed. Jesus forgave and sacrificed us. We need this healing process. We are victims and aggressors, so we should not define someone as entirely evil. Religion can play a vital role in forgiving, although it is difficult, and we need to educate those who are oppressed and help them through trauma healing.

- Source: Catholic News Here and Now <http://www.catholicnews.co.kr>



2023년 가톨릭한반도평화포럼 요약

A Summary of Our Journey towards Solidarity
for Peace in Northeast Asia
: from DMZ to Hiroshima



가톨릭동북아평화연구소
CATHOLIC INSTITUTE OF NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE

A Summary of Our Journey towards Solidarity for Peace in Northeast Asia: from DMZ to Hiroshima

During the Catholic Korea Peace Forum 2023, held from October 26 to 29 in Paju, DMZ and Hiroshima, participants congregated with the specific intention of visiting historical sites marked by conflicts and animosity. The primary aim of the Catholic Korea Peace Forum 2023 was to engage in substantive discussions surrounding the extensive suffering experienced by both humanity and the natural world, stemming from the consequences of war and the ongoing division of the two Koreas.

Participants conveyed our deepest condolences and apologies for the losses incurred and acknowledged collective responsibilities for both the past and the future. In praying for peaceful reconciliation during our journey from the DMZ to Hiroshima, participants gained valuable insights and encountered new approaches to reconciliation. These shared experiences have enriched us all. Through our reflections on the division, war, and nuclear weapons, we renew our companionship and journey toward peace in Korea and Northeast Asia.

Challenging questions that the participants posed in the Peace Forum include:

- How can the Church address the structures of division and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula?
- How can we influence political leaders to de-escalate hostilities and militarization on the Korean Peninsula?
- How can we encourage Kim Jong-un to engage in dialogue?
- How can we achieve peace, denuclearization, and human rights in the

Korean Peninsula while taking international sanctions against North Korea into account?

- How is climate change a contributing factor to conflict in Northeast Asia and how can the Catholic Church respond?
- How can the Catholic Church better educate, evangelize, and empower people to practice peace-making and reconciliation?
- How can we address the related concerns of those opposed to Korean reunification?
- How can young Catholics contribute to a more just and peaceful Northeast Asia?
- How can the Church help frame and address the root causes of distrust and conflict in Northeast Asia?

Some Presentation and Conversation Highlights:

- Participants recognized the nature and impact of the Korean War, as well as the intricate security dilemmas faced in Northeast Asia, including the resurgence of militarism, both from the Korean Peninsula and on a global scale, which has complex implications for the region and the world.
- Participants confronted the horrors and immorality of the nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, delving into the known and lesser known histories. Participants affirmed that the use of nuclear weapons should never recur in human history.
- Given the complexity of international relations, characterized by a multi-polar power structure and regional arms races, the use of any kind of weapons of mass destruction poses the potential for catastrophic consequences. The pursuit of peace demands arms control at the beginning and ideally, the abandonment of such weapons in the end.
- Participants concur that conflicts in one place can trigger a chain

reaction of violence elsewhere. Therefore, it is essential to identify methods for applying positive pressure to stakeholders, encouraging the abandonment of policies that escalate military tension.

- The Catholic Church must offer a profound moral perspective to counter the prevailing “realpolitik” view that national security only comes from military buildup in Northeast Asia and instead, promote peaceful cooperation of neighboring countries in the region.

Some Pressing Issues Identified:

- 1) The waning prospects of ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ and the growing nuclear threats in the region
- 2) The proliferation of ‘a tit-for-tat’ mentality in the name of alliance politics
- 3) The ineffectiveness of existing sanctions on North Korea and the need to find new multilateral ways to engage diplomatically
- 4) The threats posed by environmental crises in North Korea and the resulting tensions in regional security
- 5) The disengagement of cooperation with North Korea and the potential failure to address upcoming environmental and security threats
- 6) The risks associated with nuclear energy and its connection to the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Aspirations Shared by Participants in the Peace Forum:

- According to Apostolic Journey of his Holiness Pope Francis to Thailand and Japan (19-26 November 2019), Pope Francis clearly emphasized the immorality of the use of nuclear weapons as follow; “With deep conviction I wish once more to declare that the use of atomic energy for purposes of war is today, more than ever, a crime not only against the dignity of human beings but against any possible future for our common home. The use of atomic energy for purposes

of war is immoral, just as the possessing of nuclear weapons is immoral, as I already said two years ago.” Following the Pope’s statement, participants understood that the possession and use of nuclear weapons by anyone is a threat to all and hoped that all nuclear weapons should be abolished.

- Participants support the necessity of creating Northeast Asia as a nuclear-free zone and the urgent need of exploring security for all without nuclear weapons.
- Participants agreed to work hard to establish cross-border relationships and engage in a substantial global dialogue regarding universal, verifiable nuclear disarmament. This concerted effort is essential for the permanent elimination of the nuclear threat.
- Given the complex historical context of the Korean Peninsula, participants agreed to exert relentless efforts to establish gradual and reciprocal trust-building with North Korea by prioritizing dialogue and engagement.
- Participants recognized the importance of resuming dialogue between two Koreas and the normalization of US-DPRK relations as urgent issues for peace in Northeast Asia.
- Participants will continue to strengthen solidarity among the local churches in an effort to promote nuclear disarmament and international cooperation to address environmental crises.

We are all deeply related and have shared experiences of immense suffering. We likewise share the responsibility of fulfilling God’s vision although we recognize the pursuit of peace will face difficult challenges. We must look past the bitter fruits of war and continue to offer a prophetic vision of hope and build a path for reconciliation and peace.

October 29, 2023

Participants of the 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum



2023 가톨릭한반도평화포럼

언론보도

Media Coverage

CATHOLIC KOREA PEACE FORUM 2023

The Role of American, Korean, and Japanese Religion for Peace in Northeast Asia

Catholic Korea Peace Forum 2023 | 131

Media Coverage Report (Total of 34 articles)

No	Date	Media	Title	URL
1	2023-10-09	CPBC, Catholic Peace Broadcasting Corporation	Bishops from Korea, the U.S., and Japan are seeking a Role of Religion for Peace in Northeast Asia	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112300?division=N AVER
2		Asia Today	CBCK hosts the 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum from Oct 25 to 29	https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20231019010009632
3		eDaily	Bishops from Korea, the U.S., and Japan gather for the 'Catholic Korea Peace Forum'	https://www.edaily.co.kr/news/read?newsId=01505526635774560&mediaCodeNo=257&OutLnkChk=Y
4		Chungcheong Today	Upcoming Catholic Korea Peace Forum	https://www.cctimes.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=771900
5	2023-10-22	Catholic Times	Catholic Institute of Northeast Asia Peace to Host Peace Forum	https://www.catholictimes.org/article/article_view.php?aid=390535
6	2023-10-24	KBS	The Role of religion of Korea, the U.S., and Japan for peace in Northeast Asia Catholic Korea Peace Forum will be held tomorrow	https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/056/0011587964?sid=103
7		KBS	"Express Peace in Calligraphy" ... Calligraphy exhibition opens tomorrow, commemorating the Catholic Korea Peace Forum	https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=7800737&ref=A
8	2023-10-27	CPBC	'2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum' ... Seeking a Solution to Settle Peace Amid Arms Race	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112675?division=N AVER
9	2023-10-30	News1	"Drawing Desires for Peace in the Calligraphy" ... Calligraphy exhibition for commemorating the Catholic Korea Peace Forum	https://www.news1.kr/articles/5214451
10	2023-10-31	CPBC	Mass for Peace in the Korean Peninsula in JSA...Bishops from Korea, the U.S., and Japan gather	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6AypIk0WU
11		CPBC	Father Ju-seok Kang Bishops from Korea, the U.S., and Japan gather in the JSA "The Korean Peninsula Crisis is very much grave"	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112756?division=N AVER
12		CBCK Press Release	After the '2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum'	https://cbck.or.kr/Notice/20230532?gb&fbclid=IwAR17vK40CiJQqv4-QDsmC8D-hlfCojX_I5OyEmelbBQTdX6UnGqkLCY_gnU
13		Catholic News Now and Here	Catholic Korea Peace Forum created space for the solidarity of religions from Korea, the U.S., and Japan	http://www.catholicnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=33472

No	Date	Media	Title	URL
14	2023-10-31	Catholic News Now and Here	“In a world where everyone is connected, abandoning all weapons is the best security”	http://www.catholicnews.co.kr/news/articleView.htm?idxno=33473
15	2023-11-01	UCA News	Church forum seeks peace, and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula	https://www.ucanews.com/news/church-forum-seeks-peace-reconciliation-on-korean-peninsula/103128
16		CPBC	Bishops from Korea, the U.S., and Japan pray for peace, together with young people	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112703?division=N_AVER
17		CPBC	Catholic Church of Korea, the U.S., and Japan meet together for solidarity and peace on the Korean Peninsula	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112730?division=N_AVER
18		CPBC	Historical Site of Wars and Conflicts...Seeking Hope for ‘Solidarity for Peace’	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112778?division=N_AVER
19		CPBC	The Unstable Situation in the Korean Peninsula... Observe the Church’s Ability to Bring About Peace	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112700?division=N_AVER
20		CPBC	Participants of the 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum Experienced “Disillusion of Peace by Force”	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112790?division=N_AVER
21		CPBC	Field Coverage of ‘DMZ To HIROSIMA, 2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum’	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112787?division=N_AVER
22		CPBC	Seeking ‘Peace’ with a Broken Heart on the Collapsed Land	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112782?division=N_AVER
23		CPBC	[Opinion] Let us bear fruits of peace with prayer and repentance	https://news.cpbc.co.kr/article/1112739?division=N_AVER
24		Catholic News Now and Here	“Peacebuilding lies at the heart of Christian Faith”	http://www.catholicnews.co.kr/news/articleView.htm?idxno=33476
25	2023-11-02	Catholic News Now and Here	JSA, the symbol of Korean War, Seeks to be the Starting Point for Peace	http://www.catholicnews.co.kr/news/articleView.htm?idxno=33478
26	2023-11-03	Catholic News Now and Here	Young People and Bishops from Korea, the U.S., and Japan, Question and Answers about Peace	http://www.catholicnews.co.kr/news/articleView.htm?idxno=33480

No	Date	Media	Title	URL
27	2023-11-05	Catholic Times	2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum Opens	https://m.catholictimes.org/mobile/article_view.php?aid=391214&params=
28		Catholic Times	[2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum] Highlights	https://m.catholictimes.org/mobile/article_view.php?aid=391157
29		Catholic Times	[2023 Catholic Korea Peace Forum] Field Coverage	https://www.catholictimes.org/article/article_view.php?aid=391178
30		Catholic Times	[On Site] Being Honest when Facing History / Reporter Ji-soon Park	https://www.catholictimes.org/article/article_view.php?aid=391169
31		Catholic Times	[Opinion] Peace by Force is Impossible	https://www.catholictimes.org/article/article_view.php?aid=391172
32	2023-11-08	bishopshawnmcknight.com	The Church and World Peace	https://www.bishopshawnmcknight.com/makingconnections/the-church-and-world-peace
33		CPBC	[Cho Min-ah's Peace Column] Sacrament of Peace	https://news.cpbk.co.kr/article/1112839?division=N_AVER
34		The Catholic Weekly of Japan	パジュ・広島 韓米日の司教ら集う 平和に向けた 宗教の役割考える Bishops from Korea, the United States, and Japan gather in Paju and Hiroshima to think about the role of religion for peace	http://www.cwjpn.com/cwjpn

パジュ・広島 韓米日の司教ら集う 平和に向けた 宗教の役割考える

韓国、米国、日本の司教12人と研究者らが集い、北東アジアの平和のため宗教の役割を考える集いが、10月25日から26日まで、韓国と日本の会場で開かれた。日程の前半を韓国北朝鮮パジュ市で、後半は日本の広島市で、参加者約100人が移動し開催し、両市の戦争被害を象徴する場にも足を運んだ。

主催は、韓国ワシントン教区「カトリック北東アジア平和研究所」と、韓国アジア研究所と、韓国平和リサーチ司教協議会・民族和解委員会。

北朝鮮との国境沿いに位置し、主権した平和研究所は、将来的に朝鮮半島の南北統一が実現した時、北朝鮮の福祉の最前線に立つ本部として機能するよう設立された。

最初の会議は10月26日に行われた。開会式典では、ウイジョン教区のイ・ギホン司教や、社会司教委員会委員長の勝倉太田司教（札幌教区）、米国教協議会・正義と平和協議会長のデビッド・マローイ司教があいさした。マローイ司教は、教皇フランシスコが2019年に広島で核兵器は保有すること自体が倫理に反すると断言した際、韓国、日本から広島教区の日浜満司教も参加して登壇したほか、日本カトリック正義と平和協議会専任委員で光延一昭神父（エラスムス）も参加した。

会議はまず、韓国・チンアン大学のイ・ヘンソク教授が、近年の北朝鮮、ロシア、中国、韓国、米韓米日の安全保障を巡る状況の変化を解説。新たな核兵器開発競争の時代に入っている現在、は、従来にも増して状況が複雑で不安定になっていくことを指摘した。I.C.A.N.（核兵器廃絶国際キャンペーン）会長の川崎哲人は、デモ、軍縮の制度を廃止する動きも、国際法によつて軍縮を前へ進めようとする連動の両面から、せめぎあっているという見解を示し、原爆の被害地域である北東アジアから、世界に向けて核兵器の廃絶を訴える重要性を強調した。

米陸西部ニューメキシコ州サンタフェ教区のジョン・ウェンスタ大司教はビデオメッセージで、原爆を開発し生産した研究所が自分の教区内にあったこと、核軍縮への責任感が強く感じたとを伝え、韓国と日本の教会には、今後行われる核兵器禁止条約の加盟国会議に、少なくともオオプサーバーを派遣するよう、政府に働きかけを呼びかけた。

翌日、参加者は米軍を中心とした国連軍と韓国軍、朝鮮人民軍が共同警備する区域（JSA）を訪れた。

平和を築くための入り口として

広島に移動後、参加者は平和記念公園で共同祈りを捧げた。平和記念公園も訪問、平和韓国人原爆犠牲者慰霊碑で祈りを捧げた。青年たちが司教の平和メッセージを用いるプログラムや、長崎教区の高見三朗大司教が式次第のMCも行った。

全日程に参加した光延神父は、互いの加害と被害をしっかりと心に刻み付け合おうという意味で、とても集まったと話し、参加した研究者からは、もっと多くの司教が加勢するようにならなければならない世界は変わらなという指摘もあったものの、そのへん向かう入り口になったのではないかと話した。

正義と平和協議会事務局の風間志子さんは次のように述べた。「今年は朝鮮戦争休戦75年なので、ウクライナやパレスチナで戦争が起こり、新たな冷戦構造が生まれつつあります。終戦を願うことが、むしろ核が使用されかねない事態も懸念され、韓国の方たちの強い救済感と、韓国の教会の南北和解への願いの切実さを感じました。韓国日本の教会と止める現実を受け止め、北東アジアの平和実現のために働きたいと思っています」。

訂正 11月5日付2面「算教川柳」の選考結果発表の記事で、ナショナルディレクター賞を受賞した方のお名前を誤記は、正しくは今井恵一郎さんでした。おわびし、訂正致します。

Names of participants

U.S. Bishops

Most Rev. John C. Wester, Archbishop of Santa Fe, New Mexico

Most Rev. David J. Malloy, Bishop of the Diocese of Rockford in Illinois, Chairperson,
USCCB Committee on International Justice and Peace (CIJP)

Most Rev. Richard Pates, Administrator, Archdiocese of Dubuque in Iowa

Most Rev. W. Shawn McKnight, Bishop of Jefferson City in Missouri

The Japanese Bishops

Most Rev. Joseph Mitsuaki Takami, Archbishop emeritus of Nagasaki

Most Rev. Alexio Mitsuru Shirahama, Bishop of Hiroshima

Most Rev. Bernard Taiji Katsuya, CBCJ Episcopal Commission for Social Issues

The Korean Bishops

Most Rev. Peter Ki-Heon Lee, Bishop of Uijeongbu

Most Rev. John Baptist Shin-Chul Jung, Bishop of Incheon

Most Rev. Simon Ju-Young Kim, Bishop of Chuncheon and Apostolic Administrator of
Hamhung, Chairperson of CBCK Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People

Most Rev. Hyginus Hee-Joong Kim, Archbishop emeritus of Gwangju

Rt. Rev. Abbot Blasio Hyun-Dong Park, O.S.B., Apostolic Administrator of Tokwon

Msgr. Fernand Reis, Acting Nuncio to the Republic of Korea, Apostolic Nunciature of the Holy
See

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Hye-jeong Oh, Sisters of Our Lady of Perpetual Help

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Jude Lal Fernando, Trinity College Dublin (University of Dublin)

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Young-pyo Hong, Peace Sharing Institute of the Committee of the Reconciliation of the Korean People, Archdiocese of Seoul

Soo-young Hwang, Secretary General, Korea Peace Appeal Campaign, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy

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Min-jeong Ko, Nurse, "Now" participant

Sr. Sung-hae Kim, Sisters of Charity of Seton Hill Generalate

Rev. Hak-bae Kim, Steering Committee Member, CBCK Committee for Reconciliation of the Korean People

Rev. Duk-hee Nam, Steering Committee Member of CINAP, Director of Peace & Unity Center

Rev. Seung-won Nam, Steering Committee Member, CBCK Committee for Reconciliation of the Korean People

Rev. Hyun-woo Doh, Chair of Exchange and Cooperation, CBCK Committee for Reconciliation of the Korean People

Rev. Je-young Maeng, Steering Committee Member of CINAP

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Rev. Ichiro Mitsunobu, S.J., Advisor, CBCJ Episcopal Commission for Social Issues

Kun-woo Park, Young adult catechist, "Now" participant

Moon-Su Park, Steering Committee Member of CINAP

Eun-mi Park, Steering Committee Member of CINAP

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Na-ri Shin, Journalist, "Now" participant

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Ayako Yoshida, Diocese of Chuncheon
Keiya Yokoyama, Sophia University, Theology, “Now” participant
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Gyu-soo Lee, Research Center for Goryeo People at Jeonbuk National University
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Hayden Smith, George Washington University, “Now” participant

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Ye-Seul Kim, CINAP Conference Organizing Committee Staff, “Now” participant
Hee Yeon So, CINAP Conference Organizing Committee Staff, “Now” participant

Joint Message for 2023 Day of Prayer for the Reconciliation and Unity

"And let the peace of Christ control your hearts" (Col 3,15)

May the peace of Jesus Christ our Lord be bestowed on you and the Korean peninsula in abundance.

This year, 2023, marks 70 years since the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953. However, the war, in which so many lives were lost, has not officially come to an end. As this unresolved conflict remains a major threat to peace, we cannot help but reflect deeply on the call to peace. This is especially true on this the Day of Prayer for the Reconciliation and Unity of the Korean People.

Because the war has not ended, today we too easily take the conflict between North and South Korea for granted. But nowadays we are facing an extremely serious crisis: the voices insisting that peace can be kept only by force are prevailing. North Korea continues to test missiles, only to be followed by joint military drills by South Korea and the United States. Dialogue in search of a peaceful resolution has long ago stalled, while the vicious cycle of militarization continues with no end in sight. More worrying is the reality that in the wake of the inter-Korean communications breakdown, North and South are now much closer to an accidental armed conflict. Experts even refer to a risk of war on the Korean peninsula, expressing deep concerns about escalating military tensions.

In September, 2022, North Korean authorities issued the “Decree on Nuclear Force Policy.” This is one indicator of the seriousness of the military crisis. This new decree states that a nuclear preemptive strike may be carried out if it is judged that attack from an enemy is “imminent.” It also speaks of such “an operation” as coming about “inevitably.” The South Korean government, for its part, has been pushing for greater “enhanced deterrents” by the United States. More recently, the South Korean government considers the Washington Declaration, released by the United States and South Korea, as a ‘clear pledge by the United States to ensure South Korea’s security.’

Sadly, the US President’s vow to ‘respond to a nuclear attack from North Korea by using nuclear weapons’ only fuels anxieties. This is because once nuclear weapons are used all becomes totally irreversible. Moreover, in the face of the Washington Declaration, North Korea has declared its intention to develop more powerful nuclear weapons and missiles. Tensions caused by such a power confrontation are escalating day by day.

In reality, it is necessary to resume earnest dialogue in order to avoid war and reduce military tensions. Even if it is still quite a way off, we cannot give up on efforts to bring about peace on the Korean peninsula. This is because God “has reconciled us to himself through Christ and given us the ministry of reconciliation” (2Cor 5,18). Therefore, as disciples following the example of Jesus Christ, we are convinced that true peace can be achieved through mutual trust and that forgiveness of and reconciliation with our enemies is of central importance. High-tech weapons and powerful armed forces are not the way; rather, sincere encounters, dialogue, and efforts towards mutual understanding are the ways to peace.

Pope Francis appealed for our utmost efforts in remaining close to the

tormented Ukrainian people, who continue to suffer. On February 24, he said that it was “a sad anniversary,” marking one year since the invasion of Ukraine. He exhorted people all over the world to ask themselves: “Has everything possible been done to stop the war?” He also confirmed that “what is built on rubble will never be a true victory!” He also emphasized the importance of having “a concrete commitment to end the conflict, to achieve a cease-fire and to start peace negotiations.”

On July 27, commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, a votive Mass for peace in Korea will be celebrated at Myeongdong Catholic Cathedral, Archdiocese of Seoul, under the joint auspices of the CBCK Committee for Justice & Peace and the CBCK Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People. The Catholic Church in Korea will dedicate this Mass to pray fervently for an authentic dialogue towards peace on the Korean peninsula. The Lord who conquered death and rose from the dead promised us true peace. Let us pray with one accord so that we may enjoy His peace.

June 25, 2023

+ John **Kim Sontae**

Bishop of Jeonju

President of the CBCK Committee for Justice & Peace

+ Simon **Kim Ju-young**

Bishop of Chuncheon

President of the CBCK Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People

Peace Prayer of Saint Francis

Lord, make me an instrument of your peace:

where there is hatred, let me sow love;

where there is injury, pardon;

where there is doubt, faith;

where there is despair, hope;

where there is darkness, light;

where there is sadness, joy.

O divine Master, grant that I may not so much seek

to be consoled as to console,

to be understood as to understand,

to be loved as to love.

For it is in giving that we receive,

it is in pardoning that we are pardoned,

and it is in dying that we are born to eternal life.

© Amen.

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